Constitution Of The Internationalist Democratic Party
(as adopted by the 8th Party Congress)

I. The World Outlook

The World Outlook of the Internationalist Democratic Party (IDP) is Scientific Realism (or Rational Humanism).

This outlook, based on the latest available facts, holds that Nature is a general process comprising of a multitude of diverse processes, which are in constant interaction with one another through alternating unity and struggle—giving rise to continuous partial quantitative and qualitative alterations in every process and, at a critical point, leading to the transformation of every process into another process.

Further, it regards that human society is a process of Man's social organisation which exists as a part of the universal process of the organisation of Nature and which moves and changes due to a two-sided interaction—that between the organisation of Nature (including the interactions between various Natural processes) and the organisation of mankind and that within the human social organisation between its different social units (including the unit of the individual).

II. Aim

The aim of the IDP is the social advancement in ideological and material terms of the world people, both individually and collectively. This aim, in our given times, is likely to be realised in a two phased process.

The first phase comprises of the full democratisation of India, on the one hand, and the step by step establishment of regional community of the interdependent nation-states in South Asia through a common market, common security system and common political union. The present SAARC is the embryo of the future South-Asian community whose formation is dependent on

the conciliation between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir problem in the form of their joint control of the valley (whether under an Indo-Pak Confederation, Condominium or some other arrangement). Similar regional communities are likely to come up in other parts of the world. All these regional communities will function with UN as their international coordinating centre.

The regional community expresses the newly emerged world reality of the interdependence of countries, generated by the post-1945 scientific-technological revolution. It represents a new supra-national state—a higher form of social unit in contrast to the national-state one.

In the second phase, the UN will emerge as the full-fledged international centre with reorganised regional communities as subordinate units. The world centre is to be based on the twin principle of the equality of all ethnic groups (small or big) and the democratic control of the masses from the lowest administrative units to the international level

This two phased process may pass through various twists and turns or ups and downs or positive and negative developments.

III. Principles

The main principles of the IDP, corresponding to the nature of our times and India's specific conditions, are as follows:

(1) Democratic style in all types of activity.

(2) Observance of the rule of law in all walks of life.

(3) Adherence to the federal spirit in functioning.

(4) Dialogue and discussion as the method of resolving disputes.

(5) Consensus as the main form of decision making, while exercising the majority-minority method in exceptional cases.

(6) Election of all Party organs from top to bottom;

(7) Free and frank discussion within the Party on all questions.

(8) Regular reporting of their work by the higher Party unit to the lower ones and vice versa.

(9) Serious attention to the opinion and criticism of the lower units by the higher ones.

(10) Ensuring the participation of the entire membership in the formulation and implementation of the Party line.

(11) Proper evaluation of members, and their work by taking into account both their positive and negative points.

(12) Shunning opportunism of all hues.

(13) Impermissibility of factionalism and factional groupings.

(14) Collective responsibility, individual duty and regular

check-up in functioning.

IV. Flag

Flag (with a 3:2 ratio between its length and breadth) of the Party is of sky blue colour with the globe (marked by white boundary and white longitudes and latitudes) in the centre.

V. Journal

The proper study and sale of the Party journal is undertaken by every unit and member.

VI. Organisational Structure

The organisational structure of the Party consists of 7 tiers.

(1) Membership

The membership of the Party comprises of 2 categories, i.e., the Member and the Primary Member.

Member

(a) Any person who, whether residing in India or abroad, conscientiously accepts and puts into practice the Party Programme and Constitution, works under the direction of a Party Unit and carries out all of its decisions, firmly upholds Party cause, remoulds himself or herself as an Internationalist Democrat and regularly pays the dues fixed by his or her unit can be a member.

(b) Party members are entitled:

(i) To elect Party organs and be elected to them.

(ii) To participate freely in discussions in their respective units.

(iii) To make proposals regarding their own work in accordance with their ability and the requirements of the Party and, on the above basis, get work assigned to themselves.

(iv) To make criticism of any Party committee or functionary at their unit meetings.

(v) To make suggestions, complaints, proposals, criticisms and appeals to the higher committees (upto the Party Congress and receive the answer to their said representations.

(vi) To circulate their viewpoint in full within the Party, get it published in the Party Journal and express it even in public, whenever they differ on the Party line while carrying out the decisions of their unit when their views are under discussion within the Party.

(vii) To explain their views and conduct when disciplinary action is taken against them.

(c) Party members have the duty:

(i) To conscientiously deepen their understanding of reality through study and practice.

(ii) To firmly carry out the Party Programme, policies and decisions and strictly abide by and implement the Party Rules.

(iii) To integrate their personal interests with the Party interests in a way that makes the two complementary to each other.

(iv) To always think, work and live in a style which imbibes initiative, hard work, self-sacrifice, prudence, modesty, simplicity, honesty, justice and learning from others, while shunning conceit, arrogance, commandism, career-seeking, demagogy, rashness, dogmatism sectarianism, indecision, vacillation, servility, passivity and persistence in errors.

(v) To realise ones own shortcomings and mistakes, admit them frankly and get rid of them firmly.

(vi) To continuously develop a fraternal spirit within the Party by adopting a method of proper evaluation of the members and their work, i.e., the method to view everything by taking into account both its positive and negative points.

(vii) To keep a record of their day to day activities in a diary.

(d) It is the task of every unit to ensure the fulfilment of the above said rights and duties of the Party members.

(e) Party members in each state are given membership cards, signed by the respective State Secretary.

(i) Admission of a new member is made on an individual basis. Any person seeking membership is required to fill up a prescribed membership enrolment form and submit it to the primary unit or above. This form should be recommended by a Party member who is required to provide information about the theoretical-practical position of the membership seeker.

(ii) Taking into account the theoretical-practical position of the membership seeker, the concerned unit decides the probationary period for his candidate membership.

(iii) During the probationary period, the concerned unit tries to further deepen the theoretical-practical knowledge of the candidate member and, in due course, enrols him as a member.

(iv) Candidate member enjoys the same rights and duties as a member does, except the right to elect or be elected and vote on any motion.

(f) Transfer of a member from one unit to another is made by

the concerned higher committee after consultation with the two concerned units.

(g) (i) Renewal and check-up of membership is made by the District Party Units every year. Any member who repeatedly fails to fulfil his or her duties is liable to disciplinary action.

(ii) All such check-up reports are submitted to the State and Central Committees.

(h) Resignation from Party membership (in case any member decides to resign) is submitted to the concerned unit, which may accept the same or, if it thinks necessary, try to persuade such a member to revoke his or her wish to resign.

(i) Membership carries no fee. But every earning Party member pays a monthly levy, fixed by his or her unit.

Primary Member

(a) Any person, who, whether residing in India or abroad, accepts the Party Programme and helps the Party in one form or another, can be a primary member.

(b) Primary members are enrolled on a specific form, kept well-informed about the Party line and induced to take part in every mass activity of the Party.

(c) Primary members are organised in Primary units by the concerned Party committee. They have the right to offer any criticism, suggestion or proposal to any Party unit, even upto the Congress.

(2) Basic Unit

(a) The Basic Unit denotes units functioning at the grassroots level, each of which operates in one or the other part of a Panchayat.

(b) The Basic Unit is organised on the basis of industry, individual factory, occupation, institution, municipal ward, street, *mohalla*, village, etc. It is the key link between the Party and the masses. Its main functions include: to mobilise the masses by a combination of mass issues and ideo-politics to draw sympathisers and conscious persons into the Party; to collect monthly levy; to sell the Party Journal and other Party Publications and to build up and participate in class and mass organisation within its sphere of activity.

(c) The Basic Unit consists of not less than 3 and not more than 7 members. It normally convenes its meeting once every 7 days. It submits a written report of its work and discussions to

the Panchayat Committee after every two meetings.

It elects from among its members a Secretary to carry out the day to day work on behalf of the Basic Unit when the latter is not in session. It also elects a Treasurer from among its members to keep its funds and accounts.

(3) Panchayat Unit

(a) The Panchayat Unit functions within the territorial limits of given Panchayat. It comprises of two Panchayat bodies of the Party—the Panchayat Conference and the Panchayat Committee.

(b) The Panchayat Conference is the highest body of the Party at the Panchayat level. It is ordinarily convened once every 1-1/2 months by the Panchayat Committee. It is composed of delegates elected by the Basic Units. The basis of the representation of delegates is decided by the Panchayat Committee after taking into accounts the totality of membership within the Panchayat. The documents concerning the Panchayat Conference are circulated by the Panchayat Committee at least 5 days before its session for discussion among the members and primary members in that Panchayat. The deliberations of the Panchayat Conference are presided over by a Presidium elected by the delegates. The Panchayat Conference discusses the documents concerning the Party Congress and the State and District Conferences alongwith the ideo-political-organisational report of the Panchayat Committee. It elects delegates to the Block Conference and the members of the Panchayat Committee in accordance with Part VIII, sub part (1) of the Party Constitution. Whenever demanded by 1/3rd of the Panchayat Committee members or the majority of the Basic Units within a given Panchayat, the Panchayat Conference is held as early as possible on the old membership basis.

(c) The Panchayat Committee is the highest body of the Party at the Panchayat level between two Panchayat Conferences. It guides and organises the Party and mass work, within the given Panchayat in accordance with the Party line. It normally convenes its meeting once every 10 days. It submits a written report of its work and discussions to the Block Committee once a month. It elects from among its members a Secretary to carry out the day to day work on behalf of the Panchayat Committee when the latter is not in session. It also elects a Treasurer from among its members to keep the Panchayat Party funds and accounts.

(4) Block Unit

(a) The Block (or Tehsil or Constituency) unit functions within the territorial limits of a given administrative Block.

(b) The Block Unit comprises of two Block bodies of the Party—the Block Conference and the Block Committee.

(c) The Block Conference is the highest body of the Party at the Block level. It is ordinarily convened once every 6 months by the Block Committee. It is composed of delegates elected by the Panchayat Units. The basis of the representation of delegates is decided by the Block Committee after taking into account the totality of membership within the Block. The documents concerning the Block Conference are circulated by the Block Committee at least 7 days before its session for discussion among the members and sympathisers in that Block. The deliberations of the Block Conference are presided over by a Presidium elected by the delegates. The Block Conference discusses the documents concerning the Party Congress and the State and District Conferences alongwith the ideo-political-organisational report of the Block Committee. It elects delegates to the District Conference and the members of the Block Committee in accordance with part VIII, sub part (1) of the Party Constitution. Whenever demanded by 1/3rd of the Block Committee members or the majority of the Panchayat Units within a given Block, the Block Conference is held as early as possible on the old membership basis.

(d) The Block Committee is the highest body of the Party at the Block level between two Block Conferences. It guides and organises the Party and mass work within the given Block in accordance with the party line. It normally convenes its meeting once every fortnight. It submits a written report of its work and discussions to the District Committee after every two meetings. It elects from among its members a Secretary to carry out the day to day work on behalf of the Block Committee when the latter is not in session. It also elects a Treasurer from among its members to keep the Block Party funds and accounts.

(5) District Unit

(a) The District Unit functions within the territorial limits of a given administrative District or a Metropolitan City, having a Municipal Corporation.

(b) The District Unit comprises of two District Bodies of the Party—the District Conference and the District committee.

(c) The District Conference is the highest body of the Party at the District level. It is ordinarily convened once every year by the District Committee. It is composed of delegates elected by the Block Conferences. The basis of the representation of delegates is decided by the District Committee after taking into account the totality of membership within the District. The documents concerning the District Conference are circulated by the District Committee at least 10 days before its session for discussion among the members and sympathisers in that District. The deliberations of the District Conference are presided over by a Presidium elected by the delegates. The District Conference discusses the documents concerning the Party Congress and the State Conference alongwith the ideo-political-organisational report of the District Committee. It elects delegates to the State Conference and the members of the District Committee in accordance with Part VIII, sub part (1) of the Party Constitution. Whenever demanded by 1/3rd of the District Committee members or the majority of the Block Committees within a given District, the District Conference is held as early as possible on the old membership basis.

(d) The District Committee is the highest body of the Party at the District level between two District Conferences. It guides and organises the Party and mass work within the given District in accordance with the Party line. It normally convenes its meeting once every month. It submits a written report of its work and discussions to the State Committee after every two meetings. It elects from among its members a Secretary to carry out the day to day work on behalf of the District Committee when the latter is not in session. It also elects a Treasurer from among its members to keep the District Party funds and accounts.

(6) State Unit

(a) The State Unit functions within the territorial limits of a given administrative State or Union Territory.

(b) The State Unit comprises of two State Bodies of Party—the State Conference and the State Committee.

(c) The State Conference is the highest body of the Party at the State level. It is ordinarily convened once every 1-1/2 years by the State Committee. It is composed of delegates elected by the District Conferences. The basis of the representation of delegates is decided by the State Committees after taking into

account the totality of membership within their States. The documents concerning the State Conference are circulated by the State Committee at least 20 days before its session for discussion among the members and the sympathisers in that State. The deliberations of the State Conference are presided over by a Presidium, elected by the delegates. The State Conference discusses the documents concerning the Party Congress alongwith the ideo-political-organisational report of the State Committee. It elects delegates to the Party Congress and the members of the State Committee in accordance with Part VIII, sub part (1) of the Party Constitution. Any Party member belonging to any area can be elected a delegate to the Party Congress. Whenever demanded by 1/3rd of the State Committee members or the majority of the District Committees within a given State, the State Conference is held as early as possible on the old membership basis.

(d) The State Committee is the highest body of the Party at the State level between two State Conferences. It guides and organises the Party and mass work within the given State in accordance with the Party line. It normally convenes its meeting once every 2 months. It submits a written report of its work and discussions to the Central Committee after every 2 meetings. It elects from among its members a Secretary to carry out the day to day work on behalf of the State Committee when the latter is not in session. It also elects a Treasurer from among its members to keep the State Party funds and accounts.

(7) Central Unit

(a) The Central Unit operates within the present boundaries of India.

(b) The Central Unit comprises of two leading bodies of the Party—the Party Congress and the Central Committee (CC)

(c) The Party Congress is the supreme organ of the Party. It is ordinarily convened once every two years by the CC. It is composed of delegates elected by the State Conferences. The basis of the representation of the delegates is decided by the CC after taking into account the entire membership. The documents concerning the Congress are circulated by the CC at least one month before its session for discussion among the members and the sympathisers in the country. The deliberations of the Congress are presided over by a Presidium elected by the delegates. The Congress reviews the ideo-political-organisational

situation, chalks out a general policy and, if necessary, changes or amends the Party Programme and Constitution. It elects a CC in accordance with Part VIII, sub part (1) of the Party Constitution for carrying out its line.

(d) The CC is the leading organ of the Party between two Congresses and, subject to the approval of the Congress, is empowered to take any ideo-political-organisational decision. It publishes the central official organ of the Party. It normally convenes its meeting once every 3 months. It elects from among its members a General Secretary to carry out the day to day work on behalf of the CC when the latter is not in session. It also elects a Treasurer from among its members to keep the Central Party funds and accounts.

VII. Control Commission

A Control Commission is elected by the Party Congress to investigate matters concerning the conduct of such members and committees as had been indicted by their members or committees in writing before the former. The decisions of the Control Commission are generally accepted.

VIII. Behavioural Methods

The Behavioural Methods of the IDP, corresponding to its thinking and structure, are as follows.

(1) Method Of Election

(a) Election of all Party organs and their office bearers is of utmost importance for the Party. Here, the Party, in general, follows the method of consensus.

(b) In every election, the outgoing committee proposes a panel of those who, in the opinion of the former, are suitable, both theoretically and practically, for the given Party work. The rationale for each name in the panel is placed before the given elections. While preparing the panel, the representatives from various areas or lower units are taken on the recommendation of the concerned delegates.

(c) Any elector can raise objection with regard to any name or names or the entire panel, criticise any candidate, propose any new name or names, or the whole panel, and withdraw his own name, if proposed. Anyone whose name has been proposed in the panel in his absence is required to have given his prior written consent before such a proposal is accepted.

(d) The panel finally proposed, together with the additional nominations, if any, is voted upon by secret ballot, show of hands or voice vote, as the case may be, for each candidate separately. The candidates receiving the majority of votes are considered elected.

(e) The leading elective office in any Committee, i.e., the General Secretary and Secretaries of State, District, Block and Primary Committees, is not held by the same person for more than 10 years.

(f) The concerned Presidium acts as the Returning Officer in any given election.

(2) Right To Recall

The majority of electors have right to recall their elected representative in any Unit. Such matters are dealt with by the Control Commission.

(3) Inner-Party Discussion

(a) Inner-Party discussion is a regular feature of Party life in order to enhance Party's social consciousness and organisational unity.

(b) It is organised by the CC prior to the Party Congress; whenever it is demanded by any Unit or member; and whenever CC considers it necessary to get any important issue discussed by the Party.

(c) Inner-Party discussion is also organised at the State, District, Block, Panchayat and Basic levels whenever questions concerning the said units are involved.

(4) Concerning Committee Meetings

(a) The normal meetings of the CC, SC, DC, BC, PC and the Basic Unit require at least 14, 10, 7, 3, 2 and 1 days notice respectively. Emergent meetings may be called at short notice.

(b) The quorum for a normal meeting of every Committee is the 2/3rd of the total strength. If the quorum is lacking, no decision is taken except informal discussion and consultation. The quorum for an emergency meeting is 1/2 of the total strength.

(c) The first item on the Agenda of every type of meeting, except an emergency one, is the check up of the decisions of the previous meeting.

(d) Every Party Committee maintains a register for recording the deliberations of its meetings.

(e) In case of the absence of members from any meeting, their explanation is sought by the concerned Unit.

(5) Party Finance

The Party finance are made up of members' monthly levies and special collection drives launched by different Party Units at certain times. Every type of Party finance is distributed among various Party organs in the following order: Basic Unit 25%, Panchayat Unit 21%, Block Unit 18%, District Unit 14%, State Unit 12% and Central Unit 10 percent.

(6) Party Discipline

(a) The Party discipline is based on the conscious acceptance of the Party Programme, Constitution, policies and decisions. All Party members, irrespective of their Party positions, are morally bound to act in a disciplined way.

(b) Violation of the Party Programme, Constitution, policies and decisions constitutes a breach of Party discipline.

(c) Breach of a Party discipline is rectified through various measures, such as warning, censure, public censure, removal from the post held in the Party, temporary suspension from membership, etc.

(d) A Party member guilty of any grave crime (corruption, immoral act, etc.) is after a proper enquiry removed from membership.

(e) Everyone liable to disciplinary action is given the right of defence and, in case of conviction, the right to appeal.

(f) The disciplinary action is taken by the concerned Unit or a higher one.

(g) When a member is simultaneously a member of two Party Units, the disciplinary action against him or her is taken by the higher Unit and not the lower one.

(7) Decision-Making Spheres Of Different Units

All questions concerning international, national and inter-state affairs are decided upon by the CC. All questions relating to a State, District, Block, Panchayat and locality are dealt with by the corresponding Committees, When the CC takes a decision on any State issue of major importance, it does so after consultation with the concerned State Committee, The latter does likewise in relation to District and Block committee. The District, Block, Panchayat Committees also follow the same rule.

(8) Mass Accountability

The accountability to the masses is the most fundamental principle of the Party, to be followed under all conditions. Therefore, it is incumbent upon every Unit and member to devise effective methods, according to the given conditions, to remain accountable to the masses.

(9) Amending The Constitution

Any amendment to the Constitution, if necessary, is made by the Party Congress. Under exceptional circumstances, the CC also undertakes this task, subject to the subsequent approval of the Party Congress.

IX. Mass Motivation

All Party units and members are duty bound to motivate the masses on the basis of Party line, supplemented by the mass problems. In this mass mobilisation process, it is necessary that, according to the given condition of the masses, some of them be enrolled as Party members and some as primary members, while the rest be organised into mass and class organisations.

X. Mass And CLass Organisations

(a) All Party members, except those engaged exclusively in Party work (concerning the office, Journal, etc.) take part in one or the other mass or class organisation, as decided by their concerned Party Units.

(b) The Party members engaged in mass and class organisations, work in an organised manner under the guidance of the concerned Party Committee which ensures their democratic functioning in those organisations.

XI. Concerning The State Elective Bodies

(a) The Party takes an active part in all types of elections, because they are the most effective way of the expression of people's will.

(b) In case of Party contesting any election, nominations of Party candidates to parliament are approved by the CC, to State Legislature or Council of a Union Territory by the concerned State Committee, to the District Board and Corporation by the concerned District Committee, to the Block Samiti, Municipality and Town Area Committee by the concerned Block Committee and to the Gram Panchayat by the concerned Panchayat Unit.

(c) Party members elected to any State elective body constitute themselves into a Party group and function in conformity with the line and directives of the Party.

(d) Every Party member elected to Parliament, Assembly or any urban or rural local body, while upholding the Party Programme and Constitution, is required to act according to the following rules so as to always remain accountable to his electorate.

(i) To open within his constituency an office where anyone of his electors, if he so desires, can easily meet him.

(ii) To circulate a written report of his activities every 6 months to the entire electorate.

(iii) To disclose his assets every year.

(iv) To hold the same office only for 2 terms.

(v) To resign his membership of the concerned body whenever two-thirds of its electorate give it in writing to Party's Control Commission (so long as there is no legal provision ensuring the Right to Recall).

(vi) To prepare a plan with the people's cooperation for the development of the given constituency and make every possible effort for its realisation.

(vii) To render all possible help in the solution of the individual problems of the masses.

(e) As required under clause 29-A of the Representation of the Peoples Act 1951, the Party shall bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established and to the principles of Socialism, Secularism and Democracy and would uphold the Sovereignty, Unity and Integrity of India.

XII. Party's Style Of Thinking, Saying And Doing

(a) To uphold Scientific Realism (or Rational Humanism).

(b) To link theory with practice.

(c) To link means with ends.

(d) To manage one's ego consciously so as to act in a modest way everywhere.

(e) To be fair under all circumstances.

(f) To link the party and the family interests in a proper way.

(g) To transform Party into an extended family unit.

Politics Of Scam Stars

Country Heading Towards Destabilisation

I

How to get at the truth? This is the central question posed by the allegation of corruption levelled by Harshad Mehta against the Prime Minister.

But who is to unravel the truth? The BJP suggests that the people be given the opportunity to give a verdict in a mid-term poll. But a tainted Prime Minister and his party, unless cleared of the blame, will be at a credibility loss, while the main opposition party in particular and the other junior non-ruling groups in general will gain a respectability edge from the very beginning of the electoral process. The NF-LF propose that the JPC is the proper investigating agency in this case. But, with some of its members under a cloud, the JPC's own reputation is at stake. The Congress assumes that it will be able to clarify its position among the people through its public explanation campaign. But had the Congress been so trustworthy, the Bofors scandal would since have died down.

Thus, all the above prescriptions do not make the matters clear. Under our Constitution and law, the proper agency to discern the truth in a criminal case is the court of law.

II

The other related issue raised by this development is as to why an allegation of an alleged crook and fraud has raised so much dust as to make a damaging effect on the Prime Minister, put the ruling party on the horns of a dilemma and shake the Indian polity.

One reason is that the Prime Minister's past record does not inspire any public confidence in his integrity. His role in the St. Kitts frame-up, Bofors case and Ramaswamy affair, his

clandestine land deals and the conduct of his sons, daughters and other relatives in using his position, do not present an unblemished image.

Another reason is that even in the current case, the behaviour of the Prime Minister and his government has not been above board. The go-slow manner of CBI's enquiry, the resignation of Madhavan due to political pressures, Hiten Dalal's grant of Rs. 2 crore to the Gold Star, a company in which his son is the largest shareholder, CBI's soft attitude towards Hiten Dalal as compared to Harshad Mehta, the role of two Union Ministers of State, Rameshwar Thakur and Dalbir Singh in providing cues in marked envelops only to the Congress members of the JPC to enable them to complicate the sorting out of facts, CBI's withholding of crucial information from the JPC, the vague denials by the Prime Minister and his spokesmen after Harshad Mehta's open allegation, the refutation of the 4 November 1991 meeting after three days—have raised serious doubts in the public mind. All this circumstantial evidence shows the Prime Minister as a promoter and beneficiary of this scam.

The underlying reason for the intensive effect of the allegation is that the politics of corruption (scam stars) has already vitiated our entire national life. Under a corruption ridden political process, there is hardly any influential politician who upholds the fair and just norms of honesty. All members of the legislature get elected with the help of black money. All declarations of the contestants to the Election Commission pledging that they had not spent more than the legally prescribed amount in their election campaigns in almost all cases, including that of the Prime Minister, are patently false. Also the declarations made by a sizeable number of Rajya Sabha members who are legally required to be the residents of their electing states are deceptive. This is how our politicians start their legislative careers from untruthfulness, violating the basic principle of our National Emblem 'Truth shall prevail'.

III

Why and how have we come to this sorry pass? One perception is that minorityism is the main cause of our national debacle. The other is that the denial of social justice to the backward castes is the primary reason behind our national degradation. Still another view is that foreign instigation is the basis of our national troubles. But all these factors fail to explain

the corruptibility of our social life.

A close look at our nation-building process shows that a unitary national model—based on a centralised polity, bureaucratic economy, unscrupulous norms of behaviour, hegemonic diplomacy-cum-defence and above all a multi-religious secularism—has been the underlying cause of our systemic weaknesses. Because all these features of our national model have not been compatible with India's religious, ethnic, linguistic and regional diversity and the world's integrating economic and cultural processes.

The short-term cause of the deplorable state of our national affairs has rested in the politics of opportunism (i.e., the populist-cum-vote bank politics, practised by all the mainstream parties). Because, the politics of opportunism often serves the interests of the concerned parties, rather than that of the country.

Incompatibility of our national model and party politics with the national realities and interests has perpetuated the traditional disvalues of corruption, crime, violence, communalism, casteism, etc., as the motivating factors in our national process, thus plunging our country into one crisis after another.

IV

Can anything be done to stop the rot which has corroded every part of our social organism? Two courses of action are open to us.

V

One is to use this opportunity to cleanse the public life and take appropriate measures to stop the corruptibility, criminalisation, violence proneness, communalisation and casteisation of our national process.

This course, first of all, requires that the Prime Minister steps down and offers himself for scrutiny before a court of law.

Secondly, it requires that necessary measures be taken to purify our political process by discarding the politics of opportunism and ensuring the maximum possible mass involvement in this process. The reforming measures may include the state funding of all types of elections, granting of right to recall, making of the parties accountable to people through democratisation of their styles and structures.

Thirdly, the reforming of our national process requires the updating of our national model in the light of new realities,

national and global, and keeping in view the past experience of the working of our national model. The essential elements of this updated model may be the adoption of a rational humanist outlook; establishment of a federal polity; granting of autonomy to all states and a special status to Punjab; resolution of all internal disputes through peaceful means; taking up of sustainable development model focussing on the qualitative improvement of environment and human resources and using a judicious mix-up of market mechanism and state planning; resolution of all disputes with Pakistan through dialogue; settlement of Kashmir problem through joint Indo-Pak control over the valley in view of a common future of India and Pakistan; transforming of the SAARC into a common market with a regional security system, etc.

However, the course of cleansing the public life and reforming the nation-building process can become viable if there is a general consensus on the fundamental national issues among the major political players and a broad conciliation among the different groups and communities.

To build the general national consensus, it is necessary to forge the broadest possible national platform of all those who, irrespective of party affiliations, agree to base our nation-building process on the five democratic principles, namely,

(a) Upholding of the rule of law in all matters (including the matters of faith, like Ayodhya),

(b) Separation of religion from politics,

(c) Ensuring of equal rights to minorities,

(d) Guaranteeing of human rights and social justice as approved by the UN, and

(e) Adoption of a sustainable development model.

VI

The other course before us is to continue pursuing the old bankrupt track which has already resulted in the polarisation of our nation on a communal basis, sharpening of political confrontation even on the basics of our existing national model, maintaining of a weak economy and backward culture, making of India a marginal player in the global process and bringing of our state to a dead end. Obviously, the further pursuit of this beaten track may, in the coming period of sharp contention, push our country towards anarchy and destabilisation. 20-06-1993

Pollution And Population Challenge To Bio-Survival

I

What humankind is reaping today had been sown by them in the past. And what they are doing today shall shape their future. This is what natural as well as social sciences tell us.

How is humankind addressing themselves to their present? Do human initiatives and responses conform to the nature of problems they are facing today?

Though humankind has made many innovations in their long historical march by developing various new recipes and removing different kinds of imbalances, their limited awareness of natural phenomena has also created certain distortions in natural and human processes. These distortions have today developed into a dangerous problem. This is the two-sided problem of environmental degradation, on the one hand, and burgeoning human population, on the other. If humankind fails to resolve this problem properly, this will endanger not only their survival but also that of other bio-species.

II

The state of this twin challenge, as evident from facts provided by different competent agencies and now known to everyone, is highly distressing.

The environmental degradation has assumed threatening proportions. It has been mainly caused by the overproduction of greenhouse gases (i.e., Carbon-dioxide, Chlorofluoro-carbons, Methane, Halogens, etc.) which are resulting in the depletion of the Ozone layer (which protects humankind from the negative effects of Sun's ultra-violet radiation), on the one hand, and leading to the increase in the global warming, on the other. The depletion of the Ozone layer is causing serious human ailments (like cancer, blindness, etc.) and having bad effects on other bio-species by producing genetic changes, while the increase in

greenhouse gases, by trapping the Sun's heat, is adversely affecting our climate, bringing in changes in the patterns of seasons, food chain, melting of snows, rising of sea levels, acid rains, etc. If the present level of environmental degradation continues, our planet, according to experts, will become uninhabitable for bio-species in about 100 years.

The burgeoning population is also posing a serious challenge. For thousands of years, the world population grew at a snail's pace. It took over a million years to reach one billion in 1800 A D. The second billion was added in 130 years, the third in 30 and the fourth in 15 years. During this decade, 100 million people per year will be added on our planet. Over 90% of the growth is taking place in the developing countries. The burgeoning population forces man to encroach on natural resources. The result is that the earth is losing 25 billion tonnes of its top soil and 17 million hectares of tropical forest every year. Nearly 70% of the world's forests have already been cleared. Due to the shrinking of forest cover, many species of birds and animals have either become extinct or less in number. The world is moving headlong towards disaster. May be, we might have reached its brinks.

III

This unprecedented state of affairs demands that humankind gives top priority to counter this danger. But this is easier said than done.

Despite pious declarations (like Agenda-21) by the Rio Earth Summit and various statements by the different UN agencies and environmental organisations, no meaningful decrease in the twin challenge has taken place. The declarations and statements have made the world better informed but not motivated the countries for action. This is evident from the fact that this challenge has neither attained priority in the global agenda nor become the passionate concern for any country. The North, accounting for only 25% of the world population, goes on with its unsustainable development model by appropriating 80% of the world resources, while the South, with 75% of the world population, continues striving to reach the level of North's unsustainable frugality. Nobody wants curbs on its resources' misuse and wastes.

Thus all pointers indicate that the twin challenge is not being properly managed by the human community.

IV

Five main obstacles are at the moment throttling a global human initiative.

One is the one-sided human approach towards the inter-relation between Man and Nature. The basic premise of this approach has been the human assumption about the infiniteness of Nature, on the one band, and Man's centric position in that infinite existence, on the other. All ancient and modern social theories have continued to uphold this doctrine. The whole process of human social organisation—whether clan, tribe, religious community and nation—shows that humankind has always tried to advance their own cause at the cost of other non-human phenomena. Even the 1992 Rio Declaration subscribed to this approach by emphasising that "human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustained development" (opening paragraph). Upto the 19th century, this human approach towards Nature could not cause any major harm to the latter, because the humankind then knew too little to exploit the different elements of Nature. But as soon as the human knowledge of Nature began to advance, humankind, particularly in the developed world, started to apply it to the overuse and abuse of Nature. This, coupled with the pressure of increasing population and poverty in the developing countries on the natural resources, resulted in the environmental degradation, now posing a threat to humankind.

The second obstacle throttling a global human initiative is our development process which has been causing economic gaps between the developed and the developing countries, on the one hand, and between the haves and have-nots in each country, on the other—thus perpetuating tensions between the North and the South and the rich and the poor.

The third obstacle throttling a global human initiative is the economic rivalry among the developed countries which is hampering a multi-lateral world trading system.

The fourth obstacle throttling a global human initiative is the intra-national contention—on territory, river waters, natural resources, etc.—among the developing countries.

The fifth obstacle throttling a global human initiative is the discrimination against ethnic minorities in certain developing countries—giving rise to militant armed struggles.

Obviously, all these obstacles hinder a global human initiative.

V

To overcome the above-said obstacles, it is necessary that, corresponding to the present global realities, humankind updates the main components of the present global order, devised some 47 years ago. These components are as follows:

* The acceptance of the vision of One World instead of the of the outmoded UN vision of a World of Nations.

* The making of the UN as an effective global management centre through its democratic restructuring, with the nation-states surrendering some powers to this centre in regard to security, environment and development, human rights and minorities.

* The evolving of a global peace and security system under the UN by integrating different regional security mechanisms.

* The ensuring of the implementation of Agenda-21, adopted at the Rio Earth Summit, under the supervision of the UNCED, while setting up in the meanwhile a high power UN Sustainable Development Council to act as a global authority for the development of natural and human resources by enacting fundamental international reforms in regard to environment and development (such as codes for MNCs, currency exchanges and stock markets, forests, natural resources, pollution, etc.) and monitor their implementation.

* The defining of a global value system.

VI

The human community today faces a highly formidable task. This is, to manage a highly complicated change from an unsustainable lifestyle to a sustainable way of life. Obviously, such a process requires an all-round transformation from old thinking, working and structural patterns to new ones.

22-06-1993

Realism Demands A Joint Indo-Pak Control Over Kashmir

I. Issue

Ultimately, the Jammu-Kashmir problem is bound to be resolved in one way or the other. It can't linger on for ever. Like every other process, it has a beginning as well as an end.

How and when will it be settled? What will be its future shape? Nothing concrete can be said on this matter. Because, the given balance of forces does not indicate a clear cut direction at the moment. But, a close look at the forces, involved in the Jammu-Kashmir problem, does provide some pointers to the emerging reality.

II. Balance of Forces

Taking into consideration the local, national and international dimensions of the Jammu-Kashmir problem, five forces in a broad sense are directly or indirectly involved in the process. Of these five, the two, i.e., the Kashmiri community and the New Delhi government—are the chief players. The main features of these five forces are as follows.

The first significant force, i.e., the Kashmiri community (with a large number out of its 3% Hindu segment having shifted to various parts of India), stands completely alienated from the Indian mainstream. The majority aspires for a sovereign Kashmir, while a substantial minority favours Pakistan. Pro-India elements can be counted on fingers. Thus, secessionism is the most powerful mass movement in the valley today.

The militant wing of the Kashmiri community, though divided into scores of factions, mainly consists of two streams—the pro-independence Jammu-Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and the pro-Pak Hizb-e-Mujahideen. While the former enjoys a bigger mass base, the latter excels in armed power. But they are one in their anti-India position. In the past two years, the militancy has

assumed new dimensions. Its fire power is more organised and well-targeted. It has spread to new areas, like Doda district in the Jammu region, thus further extending its support base. This has further boosted its morale.

No perceptible change appears to have yet taken place in the alienated Kashmiri psyche. Just only a month earlier, the Kashmiri bureaucracy and police, the eyes and ears of New Delhi in the valley, had gone on general strike, with the demand for UN intervention on Indian violation of human rights in Kashmir. Two months back, the National Conference, the traditional pro-India regional party of the Kashmiris, had accused New Delhi of having treated Kashmir as a 'colony' since 1950 and of unleashing 'state terrorism' and had finally demanded a probe by Amnesty International. Some of the Congress and Janata Dal leaders of Kashmir have, off and on, made protests against the human rights violations by the security forces in Kashmir. Definitely, the general Kashmiri mood remains anti-India in total, without any trace of feeling that the community's struggle is a losing battle.

The second significant force comprises of the New Delhi government and the Indian people. New Delhi, the most mighty factor as an armed power, is trying to change the ground reality in the valley through its military solution for the last four years. But, so far, its prescription has not worked.

New Delhi's perception is that the Kashmiris have lost faith in militancy. It has been giving expression to this perception for the last two years and declaring the starting of a political process very soon. But every time its assumption has proved unrealistic. It is of the opinion that its military solution, even if unable to fully curb the militancy, would at least tire out the Kashmiris and force them for a compromise.

On the national level, there is no political consensus on Kashmir among the national parties, except the one point concord on military solution. The various groups of the Indian people, having different political perceptions, also lack a common Kashmir policy, except a similar desire to keep Jammu-Kashmir as a part of India.

The third significant force consists of the people of Jammu and Ladakh. They are dissatisfied with the centre's continued neglect towards their problems. Having been discriminated in past at the hands of the NC-Congress Kashmiri leadership, they want some sort of separate constitutional status for themselves

within the Indian Union, while desiring the continuation of the valley as a part of India.

The fourth significant force includes the Islamabad government and the people of Pakistan (including those of POK). Islamabad, despite its denials, is clandestinely engaged in supporting the Kashmiri militancy. Both Islamabad and the Pakistani people, opposing Kashmir's accession to India, want a new solution of the Kashmir problem in accordance with the 1948-49 UN resolutions which characterise it as an Indo-Pak dispute.

The fifth significant force constitutes of the world people who, considering the three propositions—the referendum, an independent Kashmir and the accession of the whole of Jammu-Kashmir either to India or to Pakistan—as unfeasible today, want a fair solution of the Kashmir problem, satisfactory to all sides involved therein.

Formerly, the Soviet Bloc used to support New Delhi's stand on Kashmir, but, after the former's dissolution, the world situation about Kashmir has undergone a change. Now almost all countries (except Israel and Bhutan, perhaps) accept Kashmir problem as a multi-dimensional dispute, to be resolved not only between Indian and Pakistan, but also the people of Jammu-Kashmir. While most of the countries do not take any side, the 51 member Organisation of the Islamic Countries adopts an anti-India position. Some of the countries, including the US, while disliking Islamabad's abetment of the Kashmiri militancy, are also displeased with New Delhi's human rights record in the valley, being already seriously criticised by the international as well as national human rights organisations.

III. Pointers To Future

What does the given balance of forces indicate?

Firstly, it points out that India's basic stand—that Kashmir is an internal matter of India and not a disputable issue—is not recognised by the world community which considers the Jammu-Kashmir problem as a dispute, to be resolved among India, Pakistan and the people of Jammu-Kashmir. With the rapid internationalisation of the Jammu-Kashmir problem, particularly the question of human rights violations, India is, and will further be, in a tight spot to finding a solution on its own, with certain countries actively opposing its unilateral action, while others doing so passively. Is India prepared to pursue its lonely course for a long time in defiance of the international

public opinion? What will become of its economic reforms, so much dependent on foreign aid, debt and capital, imports and exports, etc., and of the needed defence equipment, available entirely from Russia and the West? Will it not help in forging the unity of the Islamic countries and the growth of a solid Islamic bloc in the external sphere and the capturing of power by the forces of *Hindutva* in the domestic domain? And will all this not ruin India's economy, endanger its national security and disrupt its national cohesion—thus creating a challenge to the country's very survival?

Secondly, it points out that, while India enjoys military superiority over the Kashmiris, the latter have the political advantage on their side, arising from the Kashmiris unity of purpose and their increasing international support. This means that both sides have their plus and minus points. And if the Kashmiris are able to sustain and strengthen their own unity and widen and deepen their global support base, the situation can take a turn in their favour.

Thirdly, it points out that, if the Indo-Pak contention on Kashmir, coupled with their other mutual tension points, is stretched too far, it can lead to an Indo-Pak war which, with its nuclear dimensions, can devastate both the countries. In case of a future Indo-Pak war, India's edge over Pakistan in traditional military strength will be diluted by the newly acquired nuclear capability of Pakistan, the hostility of the Kashmiri community behind the main war theatre and the lack of international sympathy for India.

Fourthly, it points out that, as long as the Jammu-Kashmir problem remains, it will go on fuelling the arms race, particularly the nuclear ones, between India and Pakistan, maintaining the priority of defence over development in the respective budgets of the two countries, hindering their mutual trade and throttling the development of SAARC—thus perpetuating the backward condition of their economies, the miserable state of their living conditions and the strong but harmful impact of the Hindu and Muslim fundamentalisms.

Fifthly, it points out that, whatever happens, today's Jammu-Kashmir will not be the same ten years from now. If the valley remains within India, it will stay as a state with an enhanced constitutional status. Otherwise, it may become either a sovereign state or an autonomous region under a joint Indo-Pak or UN control.

IV. Misperceptions

All the above pointers emphasise the need for all sides to have a greater sense of realism on the various issues concerning the Jammu-Kashmir problem.

On The Nature Of Kashmir Problem

Islamabad exaggerates reality when it poses the Jammu-Kashmir problem as an Islamic question. The experience shows that the theory of pan-Islamism has proved ineffective and unworkable everywhere, e.g., separation of Bangladesh from Islamic Pakistan, Iran-Iraq war, Iraq-Kuwait war, intra-clashes among Afghan Mujahideen groups, etc.

Similarly, New Delhi misperceives reality when, characterising Jammu-Kashmir state as an inalienable part of India in conformity to the Indian Constitution, it views this problem as a law and order problem which is to be handled through a military option. But the theory of Jammu-Kashmir's final accession to India looks inconsistent in the light of its own role in a series of developments—like the 1964 Indo-Pak foreign ministers' level talks on Jammu-Kashmir between Swarn Singh and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 1966 Indo-Pak talks concerning Jammu-Kashmir at the level of heads of government between Lal Bahadur Shastri and Mohammad Ayub Khan, 1972 Simla Agreement, 1988 Indo-Pak Prime Ministers' level talks on Jammu-Kashmir between Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto, six Indo-Pak official level talks on Jammu-Kashmir during 1990-93, continued existence of the UN observers' offices in Jammu, Srinagar and Muzaffarabad since 1948-49, still pending 1948-49 UN Resolutions on Jammu-Kashmir in the General Assembly, etc. All these facts show Pakistan as a party to the Kashmir problem and the latter as an unresolved question.

The series of post-1947 developments show that the assertion of *Kashmiriat* (i.e., Kashmiri identity) has been a continuing process, e.g., the introduction of Article 370 in the Indian Constitution, the persistent refusal of the National Conference leadership to transform the latter into a state unit of the Congress. Even in the ongoing struggle, it is the primary issue for the majority of the Kashmiris both in the Valley and the Azad Kashmir. That is why it is mainly anti-India (because of the latter being the principal adversary in the current contest) and secondly anti-Pak (despite the latter's support of their anti-India fight) oriented.

On The Primary Cause Of The Kashmir Problem

Islamabad misperceives reality when it sees Islam as the main factor in inflaming the anti-India movement. The negativeness of this perception is evident from the position taken by the majority of the Kashmiris in the fateful events of 1947, 1965, 1971, 1975, 1977 and 1983.

New Delhi too magnifies reality when it holds Pakistani support of Kashmiri militancy as the chief factor for instigating anti-India movement. The weakness of this argument becomes evident when New Delhi rejects Islamabad's proposal (made in 1990) to appoint a mutually acceptable mechanism to finding out the validity of New Delhi's accusation.

The fact is that New Delhi's post-1947 revivalist approach (called *Sarva Dharma Sama Bhav*), perpetuating communalism and casteism all over the country and discriminating against all Indian minorities (evident from the anti-government struggles of the Sikhs, Muslims, and Christians all over the country, especially the armed struggles in all minority dominated areas), coupled with the centralised Nehruvian model (consistently eroding Article 370 of the Indian Constitution) and the mismanagement and the denial of democratic rights in the valley since 1947—are the three important reasons for causing total estrangement in the valley from the Indian Union. This estrangement has motivated the Kashmiris to demand separation from India and induced its militant sections to take up the gun.

On The Position Of The Kashmiri Militancy

Islamabad disregards reality when it considers the Islamic orientation of the Kashmiri militancy as an advancement of the Pakistani cause. The experience of the Islamic oriented Afghan militancy shows how it has cost a lot to both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

New Delhi too overlooks reality by holding Kashmiri militancy as the chief issue of the Jammu-Kashmir problem and then regarding the gun as the only solution. The facts indicate that the Kashmiri militancy erupted only when the Kashmiri psyche was fully alienated from New Delhi. The Kashmiri militancy is thus only an offshoot of the Kashmiri alienation, the real issue in the valley. Even if militancy is ended, alienation will remain. Without ending alienation, no political process can be started in Kashmir.

Alienation, as shown by experience, can be ended by winning the hearts and minds of the concerned people. Obviously, the

hearts and minds of the Kashmiris cannot be won at gun point or by state terrorism. The brutal incidents like Sopore, Lal Chowk and so many other places, making no distinction between the militants and the common people, cause total alienation and further fan militancy. Nor the hearts and minds of the Kashmiris can be won by a politics of manipulation—a foul political play resorted to by New Delhi in the valley since 1947. Its military solution, based on police methods, is making New Delhi to step by step lose its case. To win over the hearts and minds of the people and bring peace to the valley, what is required is a fair and just Kashmir policy.

Unless misperceptions are rectified, the actual reality cannot be seen.

V. Realities

Misreadings can only be ended by reviewing our concepts in the light of new and old facts—thus seeing actual realities.

What actual realities do the preceding facts bring out?

(a) That the Jammu-Kashmir problem is a disputable question between India, Pakistan and the people of Jammu-Kashmir.

(b) That the Indian nation is not prepared to part with Kashmir and the Pakistani nation is not ready to accept Kashmir valley's final accession to India, while the Kashmiris want to opt out of India.

(c) That the people of Jammu and Ladakh desire statehood and the union territory status respectively within the Indian Union. The people of Doda, Rajouri and Poonch districts in Jammu region have divided opinion—some favouring statehood for Jammu within the Indian Union, while others supporting the Kashmiri standpoint. The people of Kargil district in Ladakh region have not yet expressed their opinion in this regard. The majority of Azad Kashmir people, minus the Kashmiris, want to be a part of Pakistan. The Kashmiri migrants want a safe and secure settlement in the valley.

(d) That both New Delhi and Islamabad have proved incapable of solving the Kashmir tangle amicably.

(e) That the human community has entered a new era in which the process of globalisation or the interdependence of countries, caused by the post-1945 scientific-technological revolution, has transformed the major national problems into global ones. Today, each country and every grouping of countries, according to their given conditions, are undertaking reforms to adjust their

respective systems to the global process. In most of the countries, the reform process is proceeding in a peaceful and orderly way, while in some, where the dominant groups are still resisting to grant equal rights to the minorities or honour human rights in the reforms package, it has turned out violent, sometimes even resulting in the destabilisation of a part or the whole of that country. Clearly, the road to globalisation lies in full internal democratisation and all-round external cooperation and friendship with all countries.

VI. A Realistic Solution

From the afore-mentioned realities, it can be seen that a fair and just solution of the Jammu-Kashmir problem is, and can be, the one that is globally oriented and takes into account the interests of all the parties involved in the dispute or gives satisfaction to each party of getting something.

Obviously, such a perspective can only seek a solution out of the national bounds. So, it cannot accept those solutions which favour one side or are unacceptable to the other.

For instance, the solution of plebiscite is not acceptable to India, while that of partition on the present ceasefire line in Jammu-Kashmir state is unacceptable to Pakistan as well as Kashmiris. Similarly, the solution of Kashmir valley to be made independent is not acceptable to India and perhaps Pakistan too, while a Triest-like solution is unacceptable to Kashmiris. Likewise, the military solution can either lead to the destruction of all parties in a nuclear war or benefit only the victorious one; also, the military solution has ceased to be a long-term remedy in the new era. In the same manner, the solution of elections under the control of the Indian Election Commission is unacceptable to the Kashmiris and Pakistan, while that under the supervision of an international agency (e.g., the UN, NAM, AI, etc.) may harm the interests of India. Farcical elections spoil matters everywhere and at all times. And no parallels can be drawn between Jammu-Kashmir and Punjab. Moreover, the solution of placing the valley or the Jammu-Kashmir state under the UN custody for a period of ten years ignores the interests of India as well as Pakistan.

In our opinion, the most realistic solution that meets the respective interests of the three sides and is also beneficial to the world people is the solution that ensures semi-independence (or full autonomy) to the Kashmir Valley or the entire Jammu-

Kashmir state (consisting of six equally autonomous ethnic regions) with the approval of the concerned people under the joint control of India and Pakistan (be it called an Indo-Pak condominium or confederation) which handles only the defence and the currency of the confederal unit. The phases of the initiation and the implementation of this process should be worked out in a meeting of the concerned parties.

The establishment of Indo-Pak condominium or confederation, dealing with joint Indo-Pak defence and joint Indo-Pak control over Kashmir or Jammu-Kashmir (as the case may be), is not only a fair and just solution of the Jammu-Kashmir problem, but also a way to the modernisation of both India and Pakistan and also the SAARC. It will lead to the ending of regional conflicts, stopping of arms race, strengthening of democracy and secularism, boosting of economic development, halting of the advance towards *Hindutva* and Islamic bloc and improving of environment in South Asia. In brief, it represents the development of a higher social order as demanded by the world globalisation process.

The ceaseless post-1947 Indo-Pak confrontation has not only hampered the respective all-round development of the two countries, but also harmed the interests of other South Asian states by hindering the consolidation of the SAARC and its further advance towards a common market. This process needs to be reversed at the earliest. That is why India's unity and prosperity today lies neither in the Nehruvian Model, nor in *Hindutva*, Mandalism or any united front against the Islamic bloc. And similarly, Pakistan's integrity and progress today rests not with any anti-India front or pan-Islamic grouping. The prosperousness of both countries depends on making a breakthrough in their mutual relations and opening the gateway to a common future.

Thus, the lessons of the past and the imperatives of the present and the future impel us to take the path of Indo-Pak confederation. A faulty perspective on Jammu-Kashmir problem will not only complicate its solution but also harm both India and Pakistan.

VII. A New Agenda

At the moment, both New Delhi and Islamabad go on repeating the old shibboleths and pushing forward their respective jingoist lines—thus creating a dangerous situation in

the sub-continent as well as the world.

Conditioned by the 1947 mindsets, the present-day Indian and Pakistani leaderships lack the awareness of the new opportunities, thrown up by the new world era. Therefore, the responsibility for utilising these opportunities now devolves on the people of the two countries.

In the given situation, the people of Jammu-Kashmir can play a crucial role in the historical movement of our times. By raising the fair and just banner of Indo-Pak confederation for the settlement of the Kashmir problem, they will not only get their aspirations fulfilled but also put forth a new agenda before the Indo-Pak people and act as a bridge in connecting them. This initiative will be welcomed not only by the Indo-Pak, but also the world people. 25-06-1993

Bloody Saga Of Bosnian-Yugoslavian Tragedy— Culpability Of Germany, EC & US

I. Problem

(1) Yugoslavia collapsed in June 1992. Bosnia is nearing that end very soon. About 90,000 human lives were lost in the Yugoslavian conflagration. The Bosnian cauldron has already eaten up over 1,50,000 human beings. Over two million people have become refugees who are now roaming in various countries of Europe.

(2) Was there no alternative to this catastrophe? Was it inevitable? These questions cannot be answered off hand. Only when we look at the chain of events, can we be able to discern the nature and cause of this calamity and draw appropriate lessons.

II. Process

(3) Looking at the whole process, it can be seen that the state of Yugoslavia—formed out of Serb, Croat and Slovenian communities—was created by the Allied Powers in 1918, after the end of the First World War. Following the 1941 Nazi invasion, it was partitioned among the axis powers, with Croatia becoming the largest independent unit by the incorporation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into it. The war left bitter memories, with some of the horrific atrocities committed against Serbs, Jews and Roma by Germany and its Croat allies. However, the partisans under Josip Broz Tito, drawn from all sections of the population, won in 1944. Yugoslavia, then carved out of six regions—i.e., Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia became a Communist State under Tito, joining the Communist Bloc led by Stalin. But, in 1948, it broke away from that bloc, adopted the path of socialist self-management internally and of non-alignment externally.

(4) Supported by the West, particularly the US, Yugoslavia

enjoyed an economic boom in the 1950s and 1960s. The 1970s marked a period of average growth. Though there were some outbreaks of Croatian discontent, yet Tito, who himself was of mixed Croatian and Slovenian origin, handled them skilfully.

(5) By the time of Tito's death in 1980, the foreign debt was going up and the economic gap was widening. The economic reforms launched by the Prime Minister, Ante Marcovic, in the post-Tito phase did not yield fruitful results. With the worsening of the economic situation, there was discontentment among the masses.

(6) The election of Slobodan Milosevic, a Greater Serbia chauvinist, to the Serbian Presidency in 1987, led to further complications. His sectarian moves perpetuated ethnic estrangement, creating a rupture among different ethnic communities. In 1989, he launched a campaign of repression against the Albanian minority in Kosovo, a republic of Yugoslavia where the Albanians outnumber the Serbs ten to one. Later, he began to dodge the sharing of Federal Presidency with the Presidents of other Republics.

(7) Angered by Slobodan's provocations, Croatia and Slovenia declared themselves independent from the Yugoslavian Federation in June 1991. The punitive war launched against Slovenia, an ethnically homogeneous Republic ended in defeat, while that against Croatia, with a 60-40% Croat-Serb proportion, dragged on for a year. The formidable Serbian minority in Croatia raised the banner of revolt which received much impetus from the discriminatory policy adopted by the Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman. The ensuing war resulted in the disruption of Yugoslavian as well as Croatian economies and a huge loss in human terms to both sides.

(8) A timely outside mediation, particularly from the West, could have helped a lot in halting the worsening situation. But neither the UN nor the West took an appropriate initiative. The constant ceasefires, negotiated between the quarrelling parties by the European Community (EC) Peace Conference headed by the British diplomat, Lord Carrington, proved totally ineffective. And the different peace resolutions adopted by the Security Council turned out entirely fruitless. The EC stood divided from the very beginning. Germany actively sympathised with the Croatian cause, while, Britain and France took a neutral position. As the ethnic war intensified in Croatia, Germany suddenly announced its recognition of the former as an independent state. The mounting German pressure later forced the EC to accept the

sovereign position of Croatia and Slovenia. In the early phase of the Yugoslavian civil war, the US emphasised its support for the democratic resolution of the ethnic disputes within the framework of the federal structure. But as soon as Germany and the EC took a new turn, it too shifted its position.

(9) The February-March 1992 lull in the fighting provided the UN an occasion to deploy its 14,000 peace-keeping troops in Croatia. But the fighting again flared up after some time. The stringent sanctions—i.e., a trade ban, an oil embargo, a freeze on overseas assets and airlines flights, etc.—imposed against Yugoslavia had a little effect.

(10) The EC recognition of Croatia and Slovenia as full-fledged states encouraged Bosnia-Herzegovina to prepare its own case for a sovereign entity. After carrying out a referendum on the question of independence versus remaining as part of rump Yugoslavia (now comprising of Serbia and Montenegro) in April 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared itself as a separate state which was accorded due recognition by many countries. The Bosnian referendum was boycotted by its Serbian minority, constituting about 34% of the total population, with 43% Muslim and 17% Croat segments.

(11) Since the declaration of its independence, a brutal intra-ethnic war has been raging in Bosnia. It started as a conflict between Serbs, on the one side, and the Muslims and the Croats, on the other. This alignment continued for almost a year. Only, in the present phase, it has changed into a three cornered conflict after the falling out of the Muslims and the Croats. Each of the three warring groups has adopted the policy of ethnic cleansing and committed the worst crimes against humanity.

(12) To resolve its protracted crisis, the Bosnian Presidency has continuously been pleading with the West to send its troops. But the latter has always shirked to take on an interventionist role or militarily involve itself in this endless contest.

(13) The international mediators—the UN envoy Cyrus Vance and the EC representative David Owen—have yet to make an impact. Their six month old peace plan which envisions the division of Bosnia into 10 ethnically controlled autonomous states under a loose federal setup—has already been rejected by the concerned parties. The more the peace conferences and the more the replacing of the old negotiators by the new ones, the more the intra-ethnic blood bath.

(14) At the moment, about 70% of Bosnia's territory is under

the possession of Serbs, 17% is controlled by the Croats and only 13% remains with the Muslims. With the occupation of such a vast Bosnian territory, the native Serbs and Croats have put forth their own peace proposal which envisages the reconstitution of the Republic into three mini-ethnic states under a Confederation. While this proposal is acceptable to the international mediators, the Bosnian collective Presidency is divided on it. President Alija Izetbegovic, under pressure from the military equations on the ground and the Western diplomatic arms twisting, seems inclined to accept the Serb-Croat proposal, but his rival group is engaged in drawing up its own peace formula. The nightmarish problems of the Bosnian-Yugoslavian tangle know no bounds.

III. Nature

(15) From the foregoing accounts, it can be seen that the common view of Bosnian-Yugoslavian tragedy being a Muslim-Christian conflict is not borne out by facts. The conflict in Yugoslavia had its origins in economic depression and political discrimination. The phase of antagonistic contention began among the three ethnic communities—i.e., the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The actual disintegration of Yugoslavia occurred with the break up of the Republics of Croatia and Slovenia from the Serbia dominated federation. Obviously, none of the above said forces, involved in the Yugoslavian disintegration process, belonged to the Muslim community. Instead, all of them form a part of the Christian faith and the Western culture. Similarly, the Bosnian conflict started not as a Christian-Muslim confrontation, but as a trouble between the united forces of Bosnian Muslims and Croatian Christians, on the one hand, and the Serb troops, on the other. Only in the present phase, it has assumed a communal colouring, thanks to the vacillating policy of the EC and the US, the OIC's communal appeals and the splitting tactics of the Bosnian-Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic.

IV. Cause

(16) Turning to its cause, the prevalent perception of the Bosnian-Yugoslavian quagmire as the outcome of lifting the lid on decades of communist suppression of ethnic tensions covers up not only the real cause but also obstructs the search for a just solution. The facts point out that, though the Bosnian-Yugoslavian trouble emerged from the internal economic, political and ethnic factors, its strongest momentum came from

the external instigation. It was the German unilateral recognition of Croatian and Slovenian independence that set the ball of Yugoslavian disintegration rolling. By endorsing the German decision and then recognising the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EC further fuelled the raging Yugoslavian fires. There have since been intra-ethnic wars in all the three breakaway republics, now recognised as independent states by the UN. If the EC or UN reorganise Macedonia next, the latter can also turn into a civil war theatre.

V. Lessons

(17) The Bosnian-Yugoslavian tragedy provides us many useful lessons. Firstly, it shows that Washington's idea of the Bosnian-Yugoslavian crisis being a European issue to be sorted out by the EC provides a wrong perspective under which Germany and EC have already pushed matters towards a tragic end. Similarly, the common view of the Bosnian-Yugoslavian crisis being a Muslim-Christian clash not only distorts reality but also perpetuates communalism. Again, the OIC's concept of the Bosnian-Yugoslavian crisis being a Muslim problem not only perverts the fact but also harms the interests of the Muslims, particularly those of Bosnia. That is why neither the US nor the EC and nor the Muslim countries have properly responded to this problem as all of them did in the case of the Gulf War.

This further confirms the fact that, in the present era of the interdependence of countries, every intra-national, intra-ethnic, intra-religious, intra-regional, etc., conflict bears a global nature which definitely demands a democratic solution through some multilateral or collective mechanism.

Secondly, it shows that the degree of UN's effectiveness in managing any major crisis in any part of the world depends on the extent to which the US is involved in that management endeavour. It, therefore, follows that the US domination of the UN is likely to continue at least during the 1990s, if not beyond.

Thirdly, it shows that the US has not been following a principled policy concerning this crisis. Because, on the one hand, the former recently resorted to punitive missile strike in Baghdad and the retaliatory actions against the Somali warlord, Mohd Aideed, and, on the other, it has always taken a hesitant and evasive attitude towards the recalcitrant behaviour of the Serbs and the Croats in Yugoslavia and Bosnia. This gives the impression that the US is legitimising the 'Greater Serbia'

chauvinism as well Croat expansionism at the cost of legitimate Muslim majority state of Bosnia, That is why the Serbs and the Croats are confidently proceeding from the premise that the West is not going to do any thing beyond delivering them sermons. These double standards would generate anti-West feelings among the democratic minded people of the world and provide a handle to Muslim fundamentalism to communalise the Muslim masses everywhere.

Fourthly, it shows that the EC lacks a clear cut vision of Europe as reflected by Germany's tilt towards its second world war allies (i.e., the Croats and the EC's blind support of Germany's chauvinist action in recognising the three republics of ex-Yugoslavia as sovereign countries without any regard to the consequences of its move—thus opening the Pandora's Box of Balkanised politics.

Fifthly, it shows that the Security Council had taken irreconcilable positions on this crisis. On the one hand, it had decided to set up an International War Crimes Commission to try those responsible for the atrocities committed in ex-Yugoslavia, and, on the other, sent mediators to negotiate peace between the biggest perpetrators of terrible crimes who are heading the various warring ethnic factions. How can the guilty be identified in a give and take deal?

Sixthly, it shows that the post-cold war world is far from being all abode of peace and goodwill.

Seventhly, it shows that the Yugoslavian fragmentation and the following bloodbath could have been averted, had the US and the EC, after taking into account the global realities in general and of Yugoslavian ones in particular, opted for the grant of a mini state status to each of the six republics under a Confederation.

Eighthly, it shows that the multi-ethnic countries, like India, should draw appropriate lessons from the Bosnian-Yugoslavian tragedy. The biggest one is that such a state can hold on for long neither on the basis of religion (e.g., Pakistan-Bangladesh), nor culture (e.g., Norway-Denmark, Scandinavian states, Arab countries, etc.), nor economy (e.g., England-Ireland), nor centralism or military power (e.g., Russia) etc. The viability depends on a combination of all the rationality based given features. In the present global reality these include, rational humanism, rule of law, full freedom to each ethnic state under a federation, equal rights to all minorities, human rights, social justice, sustainable economy, regional security, democratic culture, etc. 23-07-1993

Pakistani Politics Towards A Positive Direction

I

(1) They were not happy to quit. But there was no alternative. Both Nawaz Sharif and Ishaq Khan were not able to sort out their mutual hostility and mistrust quietly in their private meetings. The number third Pakistani politician, Benazir Bhutto, also could not rise above partisan politics.

(2) Confrontation between the Heads of the State and the Government had reached the brink after five months of their no holds barred struggle. At this point, it had become a question of breaking or saving the country. All saner elements in Pakistan were perturbed over this threatening situation. Then, the Pak armed forces intervened and, by their not-so-polished arguments persuaded both the top Pakistani political players to step down gracefully.

(3) Now, the Pakistani people look forward to the coming elections, scheduled for early October 1993. Will they strengthen the Pakistani democratic process or weaken it by bringing in new confrontation? Nothing definite can be said in this regard. Only some pointers can be gathered together.

II

(4) Five extraordinary facts stand out in the ongoing political process of Pakistan.

Firstly, the voluntary quit by the heads of the State and the Government in order to avoid the martial law or a political coup is the first happening of its kind in Pakistan's 46 years history.

Secondly, the Pakistani Supreme Court's May 26 decision (a notable assertion of the rule of law) which set aside the Presidential Order dismissing the Prime Minister and dissolving the National Assembly is another unprecedented development in Pakistan's entire life.

Thirdly, the positive role played by the Pakistani armed forces in resolving the irreconcilable conflict between Pakistan's two

topmost politicians, without directly taking over the political power as had been the case in the past, is the third unbelievable fact in Pakistan's entire political process.

Fourthly, Islam is not a factor of political contention in the present elections is the fourth new fact since the establishment of Pakistan.

Fifthly, no fundamental force or leader occupies a dominant position in the present phase of Pakistan's political process and the two main political players—Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto—are distinguished by populist parliamentary politics is the fifth unique fact in the post-1947 Pakistan.

(5) These facts signify that Pakistan's feeble democratic process is step by step gaining strength.

III

(6) The foregoing facts, however, are countered by some highly baffling facts facing the Pakistani people.

Firstly, Pakistan's identity problem poses a serious dilemma. While other countries of the world draw their identity from heritage, language, territory, civilisation, including religion, etc., Pakistan bases its identity exclusively on religion. Thus, its theory of identity clashes with its peoples' past history, tradition and geography—the main distinguishing marks of identity. While Pakistani peoples' Islamic identity is at the most about 1,000 years old, their history and tradition go back to Mohenjadaro and Harappa civilisation, existing over 4,000 years ago. While Pakistan's official linguistic principle of identity (i.e., Urdu) is not more than 150 years old, the linguistic identity of its four main linguistic groups, i.e., the Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans and Baluchis, has an existence of hundreds of years, with Punjabi and Sindhi being the sub-continental mass languages. While its religion based theory of identity negates regional individuality, the people of its different territorial units highly cherish their respective regional personalities. Thus, the identity problem continues to be a highly ticklish question before Pakistan.

Secondly, the limitations of its Constitution constitute another serious problem of Pakistan. For example, the 1985 Pak Constitution sets up two centres of decision making, the President and the Prime Minister, with over-riding powers to the former. This dualism in authority often leads to power struggle between the heads of the State and the Government, ending in favour of the former, thanks to the 8th constitutional amendment

which authorises the President to dismiss the Prime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly. So far, three Pakistani Prime Ministers had received the marching orders within a period of five years. Though the May 26 decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan interprets the National Assembly as the supreme centre of power, the post-May 26 political developments show that the matter is far from having been resolved. Obviously, it can be satisfactorily dealt with either by adopting a full-fledged parliamentary form of government or the presidential one.

Thirdly, the pre-eminence of Shariat over the Pak jurisprudence poses another major problem before that country. This establishes diarchy in the Pakistani judicial process, undermining the rational principle of a single rule of law. In the given psychological conditions of Pakistan, the problem can be resolved by replacing the Mullah interpreted Shariat with the Shariat as interpreted by various liberal Schools of Islamic Thought.

Fourthly, the mess in its finances is another problem before Pakistan. The root of financial trouble mainly lies in Pakistan's military oriented development and politics of opportunism. Thus, it can be handled by reordering Pakistan's national priorities corresponding to national and international realities.

Fifthly, the ethnic issue remains a very touchy problem of Pakistan. The main components of this problem include: the Punjabi (constituting 68% of Pakistan's population) domination in all walks of life, alienation of the *Mohajirs*, *Jiye Sindh* movement, Pukhtoonistan issue, Baluchistani independence demand, Shia-Sunni conflict, Ahmediya question, issue of foreign nationals in Peshawar, Saraiki (or Multani) community's demands, estrangement of all non-Muslim minorities (i.e., Hindu, Sikh, Christian, Buddhist, etc.). The ethnic issue has mainly arisen from Pakistan's mono-basic concept of national identity which universalises religious identity and thus denies the multi-dimensional personality of Man, e.g., national, cultural, linguistic, regional, professional, etc. Secondly, its Shariat Law deals with the matters concerning the Muslim community, while the minorities fall under the purview of the State laws.

(7) The solution of the above mentioned perplexing problems demands a realistic approach coupled with a national consensus.

IV

(8) Where does Pakistan go from here? Earlier, the system had been found wanting again and again. Now, it has improved a lot.

But still much remains to be done. The political process remains dominated by autocratic norms, vote bank politics, corrupt methods and one upmanship. Nothing can be done if political turmoil continues.

(9) While there are many positive straws in the wind, the fundamentalist forces are desperately striving to reverse the democratic trend. They are worried about the hold of liberal democratic politics on the masses. Lacking a charismatic leader, they are trying to project the retired general Aslam Beg who is preparing to contest the coming presidential election. Having an anti-Indian and anti-US hawkish image, he holds that, in the ongoing political system of Pakistan, its army has a major role to play. Thus, he may pose a serious challenge to the two top politicians in the post-election phase.

(10) Looking at the present Pakistan scenario, various apprehensions are being expressed by certain informed persons within and outside that country.

(11) One apprehension is that the election results might not give a clear cut verdict in favour of one party. There could be a hung Parliament with Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto evenly matched. In that case, will the two political arch rivals bury the hatchet and come to a political truce in accordance with universal parliamentary traditions? If either one manages to form the government, will the other paralyse it by bringing his supporters out into the streets? What will happen if they continue to be on a war path, leading to open clashes, with the free availability of arms in Pakistan? Will the continuous confrontation not present a danger to the fragile democracy of Pakistan?

(12) Another apprehension is that, if the politicians failed to make their parliamentary act together, there can be a Martial Law. True, the army's involvement in the Pakistani political process is an old affair. But much of this is due to the follies of politicians who, with their personalised, corrupt and manipulative politics, have been constantly creating crises and deadlocks in the political process—thus providing intervening opportunities to the army. The problem has now somewhat eased, because, firstly, the post cold war era denies legitimacy to the military coup and, secondly, the 25 year experience of the military rule has convinced the Pakistanis of the futility of this rule in the present day world.

(13) Some analysts are hopeful that, with three undecisive elections within five years, the disgusted Pakistani people might

decide to put one of the parties in power by giving it enough strength in order to bring about some stability and order.

V

(14) How should we react?

(15) It is necessary that India should see this opportunity and act in a manner that helps strengthening the democratic process in Pakistan.

(16) True, the two countries have been on a confrontationist course, punctuated by three wars since 1947, which has harmed both of them. But, the time has now come when, by getting out of the 1947 mindset and taking into account the new global reality of the interdependence of countries, our two countries need to adopt a new path of friendship and cooperation. Today, the prosperity of the two countries depends on making a breakthrough in their mutual relations and opening the gateway to a better future.

(17) Forgetting of an acrimonious past and starting of a promising future requires a new attitude of give and take and forgive and forget on both sides, particularly the more resourceful one. As such, the responsibility for starting the Indo-Pak process of letting the 'bygones be bygones' and building a common future of the two countries falls on India.

(18) To begin with, India should make an announcement that, irrespective of the party in power in Islamabad after the Pakistani elections, the former would initiate a dialogue with Pakistan on the problem of Jammu-Kashmir (the main bone of contention between the two countries since 1947), associating the representatives of the people of various regions of pre-1947 Jammu-Kashmir. Such an initiative, on the one hand, would take the wind out of the Pakistani fundamentalist and jingoist sails and thus strengthen the Pakistani democratic process, and, on the other, contribute towards reducing the level of Kashmiri alienation, and thus assist the Indian democratic forces.

(19) But New Delhi, mired as it is in the cold war logic, is not expected to rise to this occasion. Perhaps, it will simply wait and watch and occasionally engage in pinpricks to Pakistan, like the recent beating and expelling of a Pakistani embassy employee. This can only lead to an increase in the already overflowing cup of Indo-Pak tension—thus benefitting the fundamentalist and chauvinist forces both at home and in Pakistan. 25-07-1993

Indian Nationalism Faces Its Moment Of Truth

I

(1) The 1947 communal partition was its first debacle. 1997 might well be its next collapse. Perhaps this might be the end of the story of Congress secularism which has since been projecting its National Motto of *Sarva Dharma Sama Bhava*. Its 1947 defeat was at the hands of Muslim League separatism. Its 1997 rout might occur at the hands of BJP *Hindutva* or some other political hotch potch.

II

(2) What was the reason of its 1947 debacle? It was the result of the pre-1947 defective theory and wrong practice of Indian nationalism, as upheld by Gandhi led Congress, to organise the process of our national movement against British colonialism.

(3) The theory was defective in the sense that it prescribed the building of the Indian nation by coordinating the Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and others through the formation of various types of communal pacts (such as 1916 pact between the Congress and the Muslim League on separate electorates for Muslims, *Khilafat* movement, etc.) and laid down equal respect to all religions by the state. Its practice was wrong in the way that, contrary to its theory, it adopted the ethos of the majority community, i.e., the Hindu, to represent the common symbols of the Indian nation.

(4) This theory and practice failed to win over the Muslim masses, then constituting about 25% of the Indian population, on the side of the Congress led national movement. It resulted in the raising of the demand for a separate homeland by the Muslims under the leadership of the Muslim League.

(5) The British colonialism sided with the Muslim League separatism—finally leading to the 1947 communal partition of India. Thus, out of a communal basis, emerged the post-1947 Indian state.

III

(6) The foregoing account raises a number of questions.

(7) The first question is as to what defect there had been in the pre-1947 Congress theory of nationalism.

(8) One defect was that the Congress visualised the formation of the Indian nation as a loose confederation of different religions, castes, sects, etc., with the Hindu community as the main prop and with each community cherishing its own rules, lifestyles and ethos. But, the nation-building is a process of merging of centuries old identities, i.e., religious, casteist, tribal, clannish, etc. The merger takes place through the process of the integration of political and material interests and cultural norms. Politically, national laws and institutions are worked out. Economically, an efficient method of national production and a fair way of national distribution is created. And culturally, new national idioms are evolved to represent the common urges and aspirations of the people. During this transformation process, a common psyche emerges among the members of the newly emerging national community. Thus, it is only after a long process of mutual assimilation and dissimilation that the old identities are relegated to the secondary position, with national identity occupying the primary place.

(9) The other defect of the Congress theory of nationalism had been that it linked religion with the state. The linking of religion with state means to use religion for building the nation. But the centuries old experience of nation-building shows that a nation cannot be built with a religious perspective and that a nation formed on religious basis (e.g., Pakistan) cannot stay for long. As such, there should be no space for religion or any other primordial loyalty (i.e., casteist, tribal or clannish) in the state. But the Congress perspective of nationalism constitutionalises not only religion but also caste and tribe. Had religious approach been a healthier perspective, it would not have been separated from constitutional and legal framework all over the world except Saudi Arabia, Iran and partially Pakistan. Had religion provided a realistic explanation of phenomena, it would not have been disconnected from the modern system of education in all the countries. Even fundamentalist countries, while continuing the religious teaching, have been forced to operate a separate system of modern education.

(10) The experience of the successful nation-building stories demonstrates that all of them have adopted secularism as the

basic principle of their nationalism. Secularism, in general, means the delinking of religion from politics. Because, no religion in the world has been free of politics, i.e., the politics of 'the divine right of kings' that contradicts the rationale of democracy and the rule of law. Specifically, secularism implies the absence of discrimination against its citizens by the state on grounds of religion, caste, colour, language, etc. Thus, the definition of secularism goes beyond the Congress concept of equal respect to all religions by the state.

(11) The second question is as to what wrongfulness there had been in the pre-1947 Congress practice of nationalism. The basic fault was that believing, as it does, in the synonymity of Hindu interests with national interests, it adopted the age old Hindu ethos as the national symbols, instead of evolving new ones. This clearly meant the flaunting of the values of one religious community as superior to those of others. The Muslim minority saw it as a threat to its religious identity—thus keeping many Muslims away from the Congress fold.

(12) The theory and practice of the majority community dominated nationalism got also reflected in political actions which denied any concession to the minorities on certain power sharing and constitutional matters. A notable event was the question of the formation of UP ministry in 1937 when Nehru jettisoned the Muslim League offer of a coalition with the Congress on the plea that there were only two parties in India, the Congress and the British, and that none else except the Congress represented Indian people. Another occasion was in 1946 when, after the acceptance of the May 1946 British Cabinet Mission Plan (which envisaged a United India on certain conditions) by the Congress as well as the Muslim League, Nehru made a press statement that the Congress would enter the Constituent Assembly unfettered by agreements and free to meet all situations as they arose. This statement was a virtual rejection of the Cabinet Mission Plan—which pushed matters to the extreme and ultimately resulted in the 1947 communal partition of India.

(13) The third question is as to who was responsible for the 1947 communal partition. Many Congress oriented historians have identified British colonialism as the villain of piece, with Muslim League separatism as its handmaid. Some pro-Patel or pro-BIP writers have categorised Muslim League separatism as primarily responsible, with British colonialism as its supporter. Maulana Azad accuses both Nehru and Patel for falling a prey to

Mountbatten's idea of partition.

But the fact is that, while British colonialism and Muslim League separatism each had its own share of blame, the main responsibility rested with the Congress. Because, the task of building the national movement and creating the consciousness of national identity fell on the Congress and not on Muslim League separatism or British colonialism. Had the Congress been on a correct track, both theoretically and practically, the British and the Muslim League disruptive lines would have been defeated.

IV

(14) How can one say that the Congress secularism might undergo a collapse around 1997? This possibility arises from the fact that the disruptive and fissiparous forces unleashed by the post-1947 Congress nation-building process, might reach their climax around 1997—thus throwing overboard the Congress pseudo secularism, provided the degenerating national process is not intercepted by some positive development, internal or external. This possibility is neither a conjecture nor a sudden development, but a consequence of the concept and performance of the post-1947 Nehruvian model.

(15) Continuing the pre-1947 Congress theory and practice of nationalism, the Nehruvian model used all primordial categories, i.e., religion, caste, language, region, etc., to serve its vote bank politics. It subordinated the economic process to its political needs, boosted double-dealing norms in all walks of life, turned Congress into a yes man party and perpetuated one family rule in the country. This resulted in the criminalisation of our political process, messing up of the economic process and degeneration of the cultural process, as reflected by the totality of vices (i.e., all-round violence, record breaking communal and casteist riots, armed struggles in most of the minority dominated regions, high power corruption, increase in crime, coupled with acute poverty, mounting unemployment, continuous price rise, etc.), making a hell of life in our country.

V

(16) Some people contend that the achievements of the Nehruvian model outweigh its failures. But this contention can be tested on the basis of a three sided criterion.

(a) What was promised and what had been the performance?

(b) How did its performance compare with similar types of

countries? And

(c) how much price had been paid by the Indian people?

(17) Everyone knows how the national pledges—Gandhian *Ram Rajya*, Nehruvian socialism, etc.—have remained unfulfilled. It is also a well-known fact that, according to international comparisons, several countries in the third world—China, Brazil, Malaysia, Singapore, etc.—have achieved not only much higher growth rates, but also a better standard in combating poverty and unemployment. Today, India stands among the 10 poorest countries in terms of per capita income, but tops in military expenditure among the developing nations. On the world scale, it is seen as a fringe player—engulfed by violence, crime, communalism, casteism, poverty, unemployment, etc. The myths about its pre-eminence—*Ahimsa*, spirituality, renunciation, etc.—have been shattered by the logic of facts.

Whatever performance—i.e., increase in food production, technological capacity, trained man power, etc.—it claims to its credit had been achieved at a very high national price in terms of human and material losses and the eruption of new dangers threatening the nation. The human loss occurred due to innumerable communal and casteist riots, army and police firings, wars with neighbouring countries, starvation and malnutrition deaths, while the material loss arose from the wastage of billions of rupees in high capital/output ratio, unproductive investment, corrupt and inefficient management of the public sector, non-realisation of targets, high cost and low quality goods, overstaffed administration, populist schemes, etc. The dangers for the nation include: minority alienation, militancy, communalism, casteism, criminalisation of politics, money-cum-muscle power domination in the electoral process, degradation of judiciary, misuse of civil administration, high power corruption, mess in economy, debt trap, poverty, unemployment, inflation, double dealing behaviour, crime, and above all tension with neighbouring countries.

The above stated facts speak for themselves—pinpointing that our national survival is at stake.

VI

(18) Our national realities urgently demand that Indian nationalism be restructured on a new basis—a basis that serves our national integration, rule of law, sustainable development, minority rights, human rights, social justice, merit,

efficiency, etc., and that can involve the whole people in the nation-building process.

(19) The BJP holds that the perspective of Hindutva—which means to adopt Hinduism as a guide or majoritarian nationalism or cultural determinism can rejuvenate Indian nationalism. But the theory lacks rational justification. Firstly, it is incompatible with the multi-ethnic and multi-religious reality of India. Experience itself shows that the homogenisation perspective of the majority community has everywhere given rise to armed struggle. Secondly, a modern society is inconceivable in which the priests decide the political matters or in which 15 crore minority people stay alienated. Thirdly, the practice of cultural determinism indicates that it has neither worked to unify the adherents of Arab culture, nor Western, Buddhist or Hindu culture (i.e., India and Nepal). Its practice further manifests that the Slav-cum-Christian culture of Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia (forming 70% of the ex-Soviet Union) could not hold them together within one country. A similar break-up could not be prevented between the Czech and the Slovak regions, having many common cultural traits.

Obviously, the perspective of *Hindutva* will not be able to keep the Indian people together.

(20) The NF-LF considers that the perspective of Mandalism, supplemented by minorityism, can be the dynamo of our nation. But this too is deficient in logical legitimacy. Firstly, Mandalism, being the Magna Carta of casteism, a way of thinking in terms of caste categories and having its roots in Hinduism, injects casteism into politics and thus plays a disruptive role, as can be seen from the 1990 anti-Mandal agitation in which about 200 adolescents and youngsters immolated themselves. Secondly, its revengeful theory of social justice, by putting one caste against another, creates social splits among a large segment of the Indian people. Thirdly, the practice of casteism reveals that it is not a cohesive force in building a modern society as shown by the tribal and clannish experience in many African countries. Fourthly, minorityism is as negative as majoritarianism.

(21) The Congress perspective of Chankyaism (a perspective of double-dealing and manipulation which runs with the hare and hunts with the hound and which surreptitiously uses *Hindutva*, Mandalism and Minorityism, according to its needs), despite being in mud, is desperately employing the entire bag of its tricks to stage a come back. Its latest gimmick is to introduce a Bill in

the Parliament which claims to delink religion from politics. But it is, in essence, nothing but old wine with new labels.

Experience shows that communalism—a way of peoples' thinking and acting—cannot be combated by legal bans and administrative impositions. Bans on Jammu-Kashmir Liberation Front, United Liberation Front of Assam, Khalistani Commandos, etc., could not reduce their hold on the concerned people.

Debacle of Congress secularism has induced the people to revert to the old modes of thought, i.e., communal, casteist, etc. They can be won over by motivating them in favour of rational humanism, the most modern outlook of our era.

Obviously, the modern problems of the 1990's cannot be answered by reviving Vedic culture, reversing Manu's code or adopting Chankyaism.

VII

(22) The building of a modern society in India demands a complete but step by step change in the entire post-1947 agenda and its priorities. This requires a number of interconnected initiatives.

First of all, it is necessary to have a correct perspective. Primordial approaches cannot fit in the present-day world. Only rational humanism (or sustainable humanism) is the need of the hour. It is particularly suitable to a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural India.

Secondly, it is necessary to have a higher form of the rule of law. The present Indian rule of power brokers, run through corruption, crime, violence, human rights violations, denial of due rights to minorities, women and weaker sections, and favouritism coupled with a money-cum-muscle power electoral process, is the lowest form of parliamentary system.

Thirdly, it is necessary to build a sustainable economy. The present Indian economy, giving top priority to militarisation by spending more on the material for killing the people than on saving them (e.g., one soldier for 250 Indians but one doctor for 3,700 countrymen), is the most regressive one in the world today. Whosoever today would stick to the methodology of war and state terrorism would suffer debacle in the end

Fourthly, it is necessary to develop a new behavioural value system, stressing rational thinking and democratic functioning. The old values of self seeking and double standards will lead us nowhere.

Fifthly, it is necessary to create a war free and non-violent environment in South Asia. This requires the peaceful resolving of all internal and external disputes. Giving top priority to the settlement of Indo-Pak conflicts, Kashmir should be made a fully autonomous unit under joint Indo-Pak control, handling only valley's defence and currency. This will create conditions for forming a South Asian regional security system and developing the SAARC into a free trade common market—thus opening the gateway to the entire region's progress.

(23) These initiatives will enable us to build a modern society in India, on the one hand, and counter every type of primordialism, on the other. 28-07-1993

Issues In Focus

(1) Cryogenic Rocket Deal

The unilateral freezing of the Cryogenic Deal by Russia at the behest of the US has been widely criticised in India. The criticism is valid to the extent it relates to the US unwarranted intervention (exercisable by MTCR perhaps) and Russia's below standard contractual norms. This is with regard to the procedural side of the deal.

As regards its substantial aspect, India's position on the question of acquring cryogenic technology is not much convincing. Its first argument is that the said technology is highly essential for country's scientific research. But Japan and Germany do not possess any such technology and still hold the top places in world technological development. Secondly, it argues that India needs the Cryogenic Engine and its technology for civilian use. If that is the case, then why it should insist on getting technology in defiance of the world public opinion when the needed Cryogenic Rockets are available from Russia, US or some other country.

The actual fact is that, since 1947, defence has remained India's top priortiy, relegating the most important national priorities—poverty, unemployment, growth, etc—to the background. The proper course for our country is to be get rid of this unproductive priority by taking proper initiatives to resolve all conflicts (including that of Kashmir) with its neighbours, especially Pakistan. In an interdependent world, whosoever adopts defence as its first preference will ultimately end in a fiasco.

(2) G-7 Tokyo Summit

In the second week of this month, the eyes of the world were fixed on the Tokyo where the leaders of G-7 held their 19th annual summit. There were two major items on the agenda—world economy and politics.

As to the world economy, the G-7 achieved a breakthrough in

world trade talks by negotiating a package of tariff cuts on a broad range of goods. The package called for reduction and, in some cases, elimination of duties on man-made goods ranging from ceramics and glass to medical and construction equipment. It represented the largest tariff cuts in history, covering 18 different sectors. This is expected to create millions of jobs in the US and EC.

With regard to the world politics, the political declaration gave top priority to UN peace-keeping operations, condemned state-sponsored terrorism, called for extension of the NPT beyond 1995, censured human rights violations, endorsed West Asia peace talks and urged the Arabs and the Israelis to take further steps for confidence-building, backed regional cooperation in promoting peace, democracy and stability and acknowledged the role of North-South cooperation in promoting peace and prosperity in the world.

On the whole, the outcome of the Tokyo Summit is desirable, but it will become meaningful only if it succeeds in breaking the other deadlocks (like farm subsidies) over Uruguay Round and if it leads to a dialogue between the representatives of the developed and the developing countries for making the world economic order more equitable.

The G-7 forum, a device contrived during the cold war period, does not befit the reality of an interdependent world which demands the creation of a UN Sustainable Development Council, consisting of members of the rich and the poor countries, to sort out issues in regard to world environment, development and trade.

July 1993

National Scenario

Communalisation Of Politics

I

(1) How to keep Indian politics free from communalism? This is one of the most fundamental questions facing our country since the 1857 War of India's Independence. But so far our country has not got out of woods. With every new prescription, its communal problem has become more complicated.

(2) In the past 136 years, various national formulae—as propounded by Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, Daya Nand Saraswati, Vivekananda, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Aurobindo, Syed Ahmed Khan, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Madan Mohan Malaviya, V.D. Savarkar, S.M. Iqbal, Jawahar Lal Nehru, Abul Kalam Azad, etc.—have been tried and found wanting. The result is that the demon of communalism goes on inflicting grievous injuries on our national organism, e.g., 1947 communal partition, post 1947 communal riots breaking the pre-1947 records, political instability, economic mess, etc.

(3) The post-Ayodhya phase (beginning after December 6, 1992 demolition of the Babri Masjid) has carried communalism to a completely new stage, posing a serious threat to our national survival.

II

(4) With the gradual slipping of the worsening communal situation out of its hands, the Congress leadership, always pursuing a manipulative secularism, has come out with a new tricky scheme to grab more power into its hands. The two religion Bills (the Constitution Amendment Bill 1993 and the Representation of the People Amendment Bill 1993) introduced in the Lok Sabha on July 29 and later presented in the amended form by a parliamentary joint select committee in that House, stress that "one of the menaces our country faces today is that of communalism. It fragments society and holds a threat to the

unity and integrity of India. Since a religious name could be said to contain an appeal to vote for the political party on the ground of religion", no political party should bear a religious name.

III

(5) Can a change in the names of communal parties rid Indian politics of communalism? Does the banning of the use of religious symbols by certain political parties help the secularisation of our national politics?

(6) The experience shows that tough official oratory, confrontationist political postures and the administrative impositions against the communal forces have often benefitted the latter. This is evident from the results of the recent administrative actions against certain communal groups in the wake of the Ayodhya tragedy. Prior to this, Mulayam Singh Yadav's 1990 factious demagogy indirectly helped the BJP to win the 1991 Assembly poll in UP and caused great suffering to the Muslim community by generating communal riots. Earlier, the 1975-76 emergency experience under Indira Gandhi's rule too confirms the above contention; all the constitutional and the administrative steps taken by the emergency regime had only assisted the banned bodies. Still earlier, the 1948 ban on RSS also goes to endorse this experience.

(7) Not only the statements of objects and reasons of the two Bills are faulty, but even their provisions are undemocratic. One of the amendments in a Bill empowers the establishment to debar any candidate from contesting elections and another one in the other Bill authorises it to deregister a political party. Obviously, such arbitrary powers to the establishment are liable to harm the rule of law as well as the secularisation of politics.

IV

(8) Can we fight Muslim fundamentalism with Hindu fundamentalism? Does the perspective of *Hindutva* enable us to overcome this national threat? The perspective of religion or culture has worked nowhere in the world to integrate any nation.

(9) Experience shows that the perspective of *Hindutva* creates dangerous trends in our country. Firstly, it accelerates the process of communal polarisation along antagonistic lines. Secondly, it breaks the process of integration of different religious communities—thus threatening India's national unity. Thirdly, it creates animosity between India and Pakistan—thus

increasing the danger of an Indo-Pak war, with its nuclear dimensions. Fourthly, it accentuates the economic crisis due to its confused economic policy. Fifthly, it further weakens the already enfeebled structure of the Indian state—thus adding to the ongoing destabilisation and anarchy and posing a threat to national survival.

(10) The perspective of *Hindutva* is an agenda of medieval theocracy which upholds the politics of hate and revenge. Characterising *Hindutva* as the unique creation in the world turns the former into a theory of ultra-nationalism which has everywhere led to national disintegration. So far, its Hindu card and the vote bank politics have not worked.

V

(11) Can communalism be countered by the politics of Mandalism? By injecting casteism into politics, the politics of Mandalism is as disruptive as the politics of *Hindutva*. By putting one caste against another, its revengeful theory of social justice creates social splits among a large segment of the Indian people as can be seen from the 1990 anti-Mandal agitation in which about 200 adolescents and youngsters immolated themselves. As shown by the tribal and clannish experience in many African countries, casteism is not a cohesive force in building a modern society.

VI

(12) Communalisation of politics does not occur all of a sudden. It is the result of a lengthy process of development during which communalism has emerged as a system of ideology, organisation and role in history.

(13) Ideologically, communalism implies the use of a given religion for political purposes.

(14) Organisationally communalism comprises of many varieties, each of which claims to represent one of the different systems of religion. Though no religion teaches hatred as a tenet, yet each communal brand advertises its own religion as the model.

(15) (a) Historically, the religion, having a process of development extending not more than 2,500 years, has played a great role in human society, both positive and negative. Its positive side has been that it provides ideological incentive to social activity by calling upon its followers to shun evil, while its negative side has been that its misinterpretation of natural and

social phenomena in the name of the supra-natural has always distorted human understanding and its principles of faith and worship have always throttled man's spirit of questioning and investigation.

(b) Religion remained dominant in all walks of social life—political, economic and cultural—throughout the world upto the 16th century. After that, it has continued to lose ground. The cause of decline rests with the emergence of industrial technology and its social division of labour which can be only operated on the principles of logic and not on those of religious faith and belief. That is why religion had been delinked from law and education in almost all the countries of the world. Industrialism and secularism first appeared in Western Europe and then gradually spread in varying degrees to the other regions of the world.

(c) In India, the history of religion is marked by both toleration and intoleration. The factional acts had been mainly committed by the rulers belonging to various religious faiths—Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Sikhism, etc. The story about exclusive Muslim bigotry is exaggerated.

(d) It was only during the British colonial rule when religion began to be used for political purposes in an organised way. Before 1857, the British regime had only utilised the contradiction among the Hindu and Muslim rulers for extending and consolidating its empire. But after the 1857 Independence War, it adopted a policy of divide and rule not only between the Hindus and Muslims but also between the caste Hindus and the scheduled castes and tribes and between the 'Dravidian' South and the 'Aryan' North.

(e) Under the above policy, planned and systematic measures were taken to inculcate communal consciousness first in the army, then in the bureaucracy and later among the masses. In communalising the Indian political scene, the colonial rule was helped by two main factors—the Congress revivalism and the Muslim League separatism. In particular, the former's revivalist nationalism, under Gandhi, alienated the Muslim masses and indirectly helped the Muslim League to spread its influence among the Muslims.

VII

(16) Communalisation of politics, naturally, raises the question as to why, 45 years after the country's independence,

communalism has arisen as the principal danger to national unity.

(17) The underlying reason is that Indian nationalism, by adopting the principle of equal respect for all religions, stands on an inappropriate basis that makes the Indian state a multi-religious institution.

(18) The other reason is that, proceeding from its multi-religious premise supplemented by the vote bank politics, the Indian state, while conciliating with all sorts of fundamentalism, has continuously patronised the majority fundamentalism in various ways.

(a) Constitutionally, the Article 25 (2) enjoins upon the Indian state to undertake social welfare reforms only in case of the Hindu community, while other communities can indulge in traditional practices, however reprehensible they may be. This implies that the Hindu interests are identical with those of the Indian state. The same Article identifies Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism as branches of Hinduism. Further, it denies all special rights enjoyed by the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes to those of their members who change their religion from Hinduism to some other religious faith not covered by Article 25 (2b).

(b) Culturally, the Indian state has officially adopted a number of traditional ethos. The constitutionalisation of Sanskrit (a language not spoken by any social group in India but considered to be a Godly language by the Hindus) as one of the national languages; of *Bharat* (a derivative from the Hindu concept of *Bharat Mata* or *Maha Bharat*) as the name of India; of the phrase *Satymev Jayate* (copied from a Hindu scripture, the *Mundaka Upanishada*) below National Emblem; *Vande Matram* (a song having a Hindu tinge) as the National Song; ban on Cow (as venerable as the mother according to Hindu tradition) slaughter as a directive principle; and so on—are a few instances. Besides, the performing of the traditional Hindu *Arti* and *Puja*, the bleating of conches and the recitings from the Hindu scriptures have become routine practices at the time of almost every important official function.

(c) As to national integration, the policy of patronising the majority fundamentalism has logically resulted in the discrimination against minorities, with the latter's share in the services hardly nearing 3% and having next to nothing representation in the crucial departments, like the army, police, TV, AIR, etc. Hardly, any person from the Muslim community counts in the organised industrial sector. However, the creamy layer of the minorities has been continuously accommodated at top positions (e.g., Zakir

Hussain, Fakharuddin Ali Ahmad, Zail Singh, etc.).

(19) The third reason for the communalisation of politics lies in the failure of the Nehruvian model which has resulted in the criminalisation of politics, distortion of economy (intensifying the problems of poverty, unemployment, price rise, etc.), perversion of norms of behaviour, etc.

(20) The fourth reason for the high growth of communalism rests with the vote bank politics which breeds opportunism all around.

(21) The fifth reason for the rise of communalism is that the 1947 communal partition of India, representing the first failure of the Congress theory of nationalism, has since continued to orientate communal mindsets.

(22) Thus, India's multi-religious secularism, instead of secularising the national process, has further communalised the latter. Unless communalism is effectively countered, India's national process cannot be properly secularised and the Indian people oriented towards a common identity, with their respective different sub-identities.

VIII

(23) Like every other threat, India's ongoing communal crisis is a mixture of threat and opportunity. Though the threat side is highly grave and the national indicators are sounding alarm bells, there is still some possibility to get out of the communal trauma. This possibility demands two-sided response:

(a) United action by all types of anti and non-fundamentalist forces (i.e., those who stand to uphold the rule of law, even in matters of faith), irrespective of party affiliations.

(b) A broad united national front by all categories of democrats while maintaining their present party affiliations.

(24) The united action by all types of anti and non-fundamentalist forces should be based on the following principles.

Firstly, communalism should be mainly countered by ideological and political means. Any administrative action against communalists on ideological grounds only invokes public sympathy for them. Communal riots, however, should be suppressed by all means at the disposal of the state.

Secondly, the argument against communalism should be linked with the mass problems.

Thirdly, the case against communalism should include all communal varieties, but the focus should continuously be

maintained on the majority communalism. Compromise with the minority communalism lends support to the majority one. Congress and NF-LF combine sometimes compromise with the majority communalism (e.g., NF-LF combine's 1990 coalition with the BJP; CPI and CPM's 1967 coalitions and united fronts with the Jan Sangh; Congress' secret understanding with the BJP before December 6, 1992; etc.) and sometimes with the minority ones (CPI and CPM's continuous alliance with one or the other Akali groups in Punjab and Muslim League factions in Kerala and Tamil Nadu; Congress' repeated alliances with Akali Dal and Muslim League; V.P. Singh's compromises with Imam Bukhari and other fundamentalist leaders off and on; etc.).

Fourthly, in order to create confidence among the minorities, all democratic people should take up their just demands, instead of catering to the communal feelings of the minority fundamentalist leaders, as indulged in by the Congress and NF-LF combine.

Fifthly, the one-sided theory of *Hindutva*, projecting Indian culture (including its ethos) as an exclusively Aryan contribution, should be refuted by highlighting the Indian reality which shows that the Indian culture, having developed over thousands of years out of many cultural streams (i.e., Dravidian, Aryan, Buddhist, Jain, Muslim, Sikh, Christian, etc.), is a multi-dimensional, composite social phenomena.

Sixthly, the idea of correcting historical wrongs by putting one social group against another and by punishing one for the wrongs of one's ancestors (whether *Hindutva* or *Mandalwad*) is only a concept of historical revenge which divides the Indian people on primordial lines—thus impeding India's process of social development and social justice.

Can one today undo the 'historical injustice' done to the American natives by the Englishmen's occupation of the US and Canada? Or can one today reverse the process of the British colonisation of Australia or the Roman conquest of Britain? Should Hindus today pay compensation for the destruction of the Buddhist Nalanda University by the Medieval Hindu rulers? How should Hindus today atone for the construction of the Puri Jagan Nath temple which the Adivasis of Orissa claim to have been built after the destruction of their place of worship? Thus, the theory of undoing historical wrongs is not only theoretically untenable but also practically unviable. The proper thing about undoing historical wrongs is to learn appropriate lessons, both negative and positive, from them and then use that social

knowledge in the interests of nation and mankind.

Seventhly, corresponding to India's multi-ethnic and multi-cultural reality, Indian state should delink itself from religion instead of owing allegiance to all religions.

This is with regard to the parameters of struggle against communalism.

(25) A broad united national front should be built on the basis of below mentioned fundamental principles:

(a) To uphold the rule of law in all matters (including the questions of faith, like the Ayodhya Mandir-Masjid dispute);

(b) To ensure equal rights to minorities;

(c) To provide human rights and social justice, as approved by the UN;

(d) To delink religion from the state;

(e) To adopt rational humanism as the guiding factor of our nationalism

This is with regard to the parameters of forming the broad national united front.

IX

(26) The most distressing part of our national story is that even now when the very existence of the country is at stake, there is a little sign of anxiety in New Delhi and in the minds of our top political players. It is time for our people to sit up and think.

25-08-1993

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Politics Of Gun Will Complicate Kashmir Problem

I

(1) Is there any exit from this blind alley? This question facing the Indian nation in the Kashmir valley merits a serious debate. But such a debate is, and can be, meaningful if it is aimed at finding out the truth. And the search for truth requires a realistic approach based on dispassionate observation, factual experimentation anal objective evaluation. Obviously, a realistic perspective sometimes does not reconcile with the prevailing notions of personal and partisan ends, regional concerns and the supremacy of national interest. Even in such trying situations, it is necessary to uphold the perspective of realism because truth is higher than all other considerations.

II

(2) It is now over four years since the country landed itself into valley's one-ended tunnel. During this period, the situation has continuously gone on worsening. Both the mass discontent and the militancy have continued to grow. The mass discontent is worse than at any time since the beginning of insurgency. The militants have now positioned themselves in almost all districts of the state and further strengthened their position of calling the shots at will. Though the militants are divided into various factions, having a fundamental difference on Kashmir's future status, all of them are united in their anti-India stand.

(3) Contrary to this ground reality in the valley, the Jammu-Kashmir administration is in shambles. A financial crisis of unprecedented proportions has overtaken the state. With political parties non-existent in the valley, the entire social activity is virtually regulated by the militancy. Leaving the few moments of military or para-military operations, it is the militants' writ that runs throughout the valley.

(4) New Delhi presents a picture of confusion and

prevarication. It has no clear cut policy on Jammu-Kashmir. The result is that different top persons often speak in different voices. Sometimes the Home Minister and his Deputy contradict each other—thus presenting the spectacle of a house divided against itself. The series of New Delhi's repeated declarations—whether they pertain to Kashmiris disenchantment with the militancy, returning of normal life in the valley or the restarting of the political process there—have proved false.

III

(5) On the national level, there has been a lot of double think, double speak and double style in regard to the Jammu-Kashmir problem.

(a) The principal mainstream party, the Congress, has ceaselessly shifted from one stand to another. At home, it has gone on announcing that Jammu-Kashmir is an inalienable part of India, while continuing intermittent dialogue on Jammu-Kashmir with Pakistan since 1947 and finally signing the Simla Pact whose clause 6 lays down that the Governments of India and Pakistan would meet to discuss various matters, including a final settlement of Jammu-Kashmir. In the beginning, it used to talk only of smashing the militancy. Thereafter, it coined the query "with whom to talk in the presence of dozens of militant groups". A little later, it began to say that it was prepared to talk with those who abjure violence. Then it came out with the announcement that the only condition for holding a dialogue is to conduct the discourse within the framework of Indian Constitution. Now it is even prepared to negotiate without any pre-condition.

(b) The BJP sometimes projects the Kashmir problem as an outcome of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. At other times, it blames Pakistan for instigating the Kashmir insurgency. Occasionally, it indicts the Congress government for generating the Kashmir issue. In the Jammu region, it generally accuses the local NC-Congress mismanagement under Farooq Abdullah.

(c) The NF-LF combine, according to its given convenience, explains the Kashmir problem with different arguments, e.g., a product of imperialist intrigue, a creation of Pakistan, a consequence of rising unemployment, an offshoot of the absence of a fair electoral process in the valley, etc.

(6) The fact is that the Kashmir problem is a part of our ongoing national crisis whose general cause lies in the failure of the Nehruvian national model and the specific reason rests with

the politics of opportunism, pursued by all the mainstream parties which give priority to their partisan interests over those of the national concerns.

IV

(7) Now everyone, including our Home Minister and his Deputy, agree that the Kashmir situation is very very alarming as has been never before. It is as serious, if not more, as that prevailing in Bosnia or Somalia, the two top priority issues of the UN. But, like every other crisis, the Kashmir problem too is an intermingling of threat and opportunity. The window of opportunity may be small, even then it can be utilised to repair the national damage, provided right steps are taken without further delay. But opinions vary a great deal on which steps would be right.

V

(8) The predominant view, as upheld in varying forms by the mainstream parties, is that only the politics of gun can solve the problem. The slight difference among these parties is that, while the Congress is pursuing the politics of gun under the State Governor's supervision, the BJP stands for its application under an undiluted military command and the NF-LF combine wants the use of gun under the control of a civilian rule. Many of the advocates of various other options, such as the restoration of pre-1953 status, autonomy of different regions in the state, trifurcation, demographic change, division of the state on the line of actual control, etc., supported the gun-boat diplomacy in one way or the other.

(9) Is the politics of gun a viable option? Its relevancy is often justified by its 'proven' effectiveness in curbing the insurgencies in Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, Punjab, etc. But this traditional assumption ignores certain new facts.

Firstly, the present-day world is opposed to the military solution. It has been continuously losing its validity in the post cold war period. During the past three years, the military solution has worked in favour of neither the insurgency nor the counter-insurgency anywhere in the world. Every civil war or intra-ethnic struggle (e.g., Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Al Salvador, Nicaragua, etc.) has concluded in a negotiated settlement through give and take.

Secondly, if, for argument's sake, we accept the viability of the military solution, then will this help in removing the root cause of the Kashmir problem, i.e., the alienation of the Kashmiri

community from the national mainstream. The latest international experience shows that the military solution generates more alienation. The unmanageability of the West Bank has forced Israel to adopt the politics of dialogue instead of that of the gun. The events in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, etc., show how the forcibly suppressed ethnic aspirations had suddenly revived in given conditions. All these happenings have been a spill-over of the preceding cold war period. In the new historical era, will the world community allow India to nourish another tension point by forcing its rule on unwilling Kashmiris?

Thirdly, the military solution, requiring the control of reluctant Kashmiris and the constant preparedness for the possibility of war with Pakistan, will impose unbearable burden on the Indian economy—thus disrupting the new economic reforms and deepening the continuing financial crisis. The further economic deterioration, coupled with the prevailing political instability, will be a definite agenda for the country's destabilisation. If by chance war breaks out, the fourth Indo-Pak war, with its nuclear dimensions, will not only result in the destruction of the two countries but also spell disaster for the world. The world people today neither want war nor like the preparations for a new war. It will be highly improper if India stands at odds with the rest of the world.

Fourthly, the military solution, putting both India and Pakistan on a confrontationist course, increases the possibility of mediation by a third party (may be the Security Council, an impartial Tribunal or the International Court) in the Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir.

Fifthly, the military solution had worked only partially in the North-Eastern struggles which are still continuing in one form or the other. Even the imperfect success was mainly due to a given set of circumstances.

Internationally, the North-Eastern struggles had a very weak standing in contrast to the Kashmir problem which is considered to be one of the most sensitive point today. In the cold war period of the North-Eastern struggles, hardly any government bothered about the human rights violations in another country, whereas the human rights issue has come to occupy an important place in the world agenda in the new post-cold war historical era. While no other country was directly involved in the North-Eastern struggles, the Kashmir problem is marked by direct Pakistani involvement, now being supported by 51 member Organisation of Islamic States and accepted by the world community as a party to the dispute.

Nationally, India was more cohesive and stable in its earlier days than it is at present. There was no sympathetic feeling for the North-Eastern struggles in other parts of the country, whereas the Kashmir problem has its own logic.

Organisationally, the North-Eastern struggles, with their uncoordinated actions and based mainly on traditional weapons, were merely peripheral movements that were spread over vast uninhabited areas having sparse population, whereas the Kashmiri militancy enjoys compact mass base, has well-trained cadre with modern weaponry, gets international publicity through foreign electronic and print media and makes use of Azad Kashmir as a base area.

The idea of repeating the Punjab story in the valley ignores two solid facts. One is that the Khalistani militancy is only down but not yet out. And the other is that this militancy, due to its copying of the outdated 1947 rabidly communal tactics of the Muslim League separatism, has failed to motivate even the majority of the Panth in favour of Khalistan what to say of the Punjabi community as a whole, while over 90% of the Kashmiri community stands alienated from New Delhi.

Therefore, the concrete conditions of the Kashmiri militancy are quite different from other militancies.

VI

(10) Another view, mainly projected by the Congress, is that the holding of elections in Jammu-Kashmir under the Governor's semi-military rule can help the restoration of normalcy in the state.

(11) True, a free and fair election is the most appropriate method of evaluating public opinion and sorting cut any contentious issue in our times. But, the electoral process needs a peaceful and congenial atmosphere. Even under normal conditions, the timing of elections is fixed after taking into account the state of mass engagements (like sowing and harvesting period , examination days, national calamities, general strikes, etc.) and mass aspirations (festivals, etc.). Under extraordinary circumstances, definite time is needed for the creation of poll environment (e.g., UN supervised election in Cambodia 1-1/2 years after the ceasefire, the efforts to normalise the situation in Afghanistan before the holding of any election, etc.).

(12) Election is as much essential for Jammu-Kashmir as it is for other parts of India. But, under the cross-fire of the two contending sides, there cannot be a correct expression of the

public opinion in the valley. Any old style manipulative poll under the army control, instead of helping the restoration of normal conditions, will be a new provocation to the Kashmiris—thus pouring more oil on the raging confrontationist fire in the valley. Will an imposed election be considered as genuine by the world?

(13) A fake election always harms, if not the immediate then the strategic, interests of not only the manipulating authority but much more of the community at large represented by the former. The long-term harmful effects of the post-1947 stage managed electoral process in the valley for the Indian nation is a case in point.

(14) However, if New Delhi is really serious about holding a free and fair poll, then the appropriate course for it is to extend an official invitation to some impartial international agency (like the NAM, Amnesty International, Asia Watch, etc.) for supervising the entire electoral process.

VII

(15) Still another view, maintained by certain sections, like the NC and some liberal individuals in the Congress, JD, CPI, CPM, etc., is that the restoration of the pre-1953 position in Jammu-Kashmir can be a solution to the ongoing Kashmir crisis. But, the post-1947 experience shows that this autonomy solution had already proved unviable. The unviability lies in two main reasons. One is the over-centralised character of the Indian Union which makes the working of autonomy in any part of the Union impractical. This is verified by the debacle of the Delhi-Srinagar Accords of 1947, 1952, 1975, 1987, etc. And the other is the continuing dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir and the resultant three wars between the two countries that necessitate more central control over the affairs in this state. These two reasons still go on. Therefore, the autonomy solution is merely an illusory one. The 40 year practice of the autonomy formula by the centre has already shattered the confidence of the Kashmiris in New Delhi's sincerity.

(16) Further, another view, propagated by the BJP and the like, is that the Kashmir crisis can be resolved by the abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution—thus fully integrating the Jammu-Kashmir state into the Indian Union. But, the facts do not bear it out. Firstly, if full integration is an anti-dote to separatism, then why do separatist movements exist in Punjab, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, etc., where Article 370 is not applicable. This shows the false nature of the theory holding Article 370 as the ideological basis of Kashmiri separatism. Secondly, the

Article 370 has been now fully eroded, having no substantial value. Thirdly, the Kashmir crisis, in reality, is a part of the crisis of our nation-building process that has erupted not out of Article 370 but of authoritarian and hegemonic Nehruvian model, supplemented by the mainstream parties' vote bank politics.

(17) More, another view, sponsored by certain people covering all shades of public opinion, is that the Line of Actual Control in Jammu-Kashmir be accepted as the de jure boundary between India and Pakistan or the Triest-like solution of the Jammu-Kashmir problem be hammered out by these two countries. This solution is acceptable neither to Pakistan nor to the Kashmiris. And without Pakistan's agreement, this proposal cannot become viable.

VIII

(18) What conclusions do follow from the foregoing account?

(19) The number one is that holding on to misconceivable notions—politics of gun, manipulative elections, fake autonomy, abrogation of Article 370, etc.—will, and can, only harm the country.

(20) Secondly, India's interests will be well-served if it proceeds from concrete realities.

(a) The acceptance of the fact of the Jammu-Kashmir problem having been a dispute as mentioned in clause 6 of Simla Pact. From this follows the need to search for a sensible compromise—giving a share of satisfaction to each party involved in the dispute, i.e., India, Pakistan and the people of Jammu-Kashmir. It will be a just and fair solution, getting the backing of the world people. Without such a solution, there will be no incentive for any party to give up its old mindset. A deal between the two which ignores the third will be an invitation to continuing trouble. Any side which sticks to an unrealistic idea will come to grief sooner or later. To try to settle the dispute on one's own terms means to adopt the politics of gun—not a viable proposition in the world today. At best, it might succeed in restoring superficial order. But long-term disorder will get a greater impetus.

(b) The acceptance of the fact that Jammu-Kashmir is a multi-ethnic unit, each having its own aspirations. From this follows the need to consult each of the 6 ethnic groups in any future setup concerning Jammu-Kashmir.

(c) The acceptance of the fact that the valley cannot be indefinitely held against its will. Our priority in Kashmir is to win over the hearts and minds of the people. From this follows the need to solve the problem by the language of compassion and

not that of gun.

(d) The acceptance of the fact that the 40 year long Indo-Pak confrontation and three full-scale Indo-Pak wars, without solving even one of their national problems, including that of Kashmir, have harmed the interests of both the countries. From this follows the need to eradicate the seeds of hatred sown by the 1947 communal partition.

(e) The acceptance of the fact that the new historical era of globalisation or the interdependence of countries has transformed human problems from the national to the global level. In this global process, the road to a country's progress lies in internal democratisation and external cooperation and integration with other countries.

From this follows the need for India as well as Pakistan to see the commonness of their national interests and the togetherness of their future, join their hands, get out of their 1947 mindsets, federalise, and decentralise their respective structures, resolve their internal ethnic conflicts by dialogue, and settle all Indo-Pak disputes, including Jammu-Kashmir problem, through peaceful means.

(21) Thirdly, the above realities demand the taking of following initiatives by our country.

(a) To create the broadest possible national consensus particularly among the mainstream parties, on starting a dialogue with Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir (and later on other disputes).

(b) To invite Pakistan for talks on how the two countries can together have relations with Jammu-Kashmir and how to assess the aspirations of various ethnic communities in Jammu-Kashmir (including Azad Kashmir) about their relations with the two countries and also among themselves.

(c) The inter-ethnic dialogue may be at various levels between the domiciled and the migrant Kashmiris, between the Dogri speaking and the Pahari speaking groups in the Jammu region, between the Ladakhis and the Kargalis, among the Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh regions, between the plains' people and the Gilgitis in Azad Kashmir, among the Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh and Azad Kashmir regions, and so on.

IX

(22) Now, the status quo cannot remain for long. The time is running out. If there is no agreement between India and Pakistan, it may either lead to war or a third party intervention. 01-09-1993

Sino-Indian Border Agreement

A Great Step Taken After Huge National Loss

I

(1) It is never too late to mend. For thirty years, New Delhi continued to chase a mirage. But ultimately the geo-political reality of the Sino-Indian border has forced it to see the light. And it is better late than never.

II

(2) The story of Sino-Indian border dispute is too well known to be repeated. But part of its Indian dimension has remained hidden under chauvinist rhetoric. Now, the facts have shown that the ground realities of the Sino-Indian border have always demanded a reasonable compromise on the boundary dispute. But, it was Nehru's stiff-necked nationalism that clouded India's sense of perception, tied it to an unrealistic posture and turned the border dispute into a festering sour for our coming generations. It goes to the credit of China that it had repeatedly proposed to Nehru to accept the de facto position on the Sino-Indian border until the final settlement of a legal frontier. But New Delhi's misplaced notion of national pride refused to consider any proposition other than the Chinese acceptance of the total Indian position. Further, a fanciful resolution adopted by the Indian Parliament in the wake of 1962 Sino-Indian war asking India to recover every inch of its territory from China's control chained all succeeding governments from taking any new initiative on Sino-Indian boundary question.

(3) Had India adopted a realistic perspective on the Sino-Indian frontier question in very beginning, the 1962 Sino-Indian war would have been avoided, India would have been saved from national humiliation, the mutual Sino-Indian trade would have flourished, the Sino-Pakistan collusion against India would

not have come about, the Indo-Pak relations would not have deteriorated to this extent and the unnecessary defence expenditure on the security of 4,056 Km long Sino-Indian border would not have occurred. In short, India would not have suffered a gigantic loss in human and material terms for a lengthy period spanning three decades.

III

(4) Though, at every crucial turn, reality continued to knock at the doors of New Delhi, no Indian Prime Minister in the post-Nehruvian phase dared to come out of the antiquated Nehruvian mindset. It was only after the initiation of the post-cold war era as a result of the US-Soviet conciliation that Rajiv Gandhi undertook a visit to China in order to break the ice in the Sino-Indian relations. The visit ended on a mutually agreed note which envisaged that force will not be used to resolve the territorial dispute and that a climate for a negotiated settlement will be created. Consequently, a Joint Working Group (JWG) was formed to sort out the complicacies of the boundary question in order to pave the way for a meaningful dialogue.

(5) The JWG, during its six meetings, covered a lot of ground. As a result of its work, the Sino-Indian border has been free of conflictual incidents. Relocation of forces on both sides are notified in advance and so are the military exercises. Violations of air space have also become rare. The JWG has actually cleared the decks for purposeful negotiations. Consequently, P.V. Narsimha Rao's talks with the Chinese top leaders at Peking have resulted in the signing of a reasonable agreement on the disputed boundary questions.

IV

(6) The border agreement commits the two countries to certain specifics, such as resolving of their differences through peaceful means, reducing of mutual troops along the border, retaining of their respective original claims and reserving of the right to make claims at JWG meetings.

The key point of this agreement is to "respect and observe the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and to determine through consultations where there is any doubt about its position." To implement the operative provisions of the agreement and to check and determine where the LAC lies, a sub-group, consisting of military, diplomatic and surveying experts from the two

countries, will be set up. This sub-group will work under the overall jurisdiction and guidance of the JWG.

Since no one knows where precisely the LAC is located, it is apparently this complex issue that will now engage the major attention of the JWG and its sub-group of specialists. Only over a period of time will the notional LAC stabilise into a legal frontier with clearly delineated junction points.

The Sino-Indian Border Agreement, in brief, emphasises three things: One, to accept and adhere to the maintaining of status quo on the border, entailing of neither surrender nor readjustment of territory for or from any side; two, to reduce tension on the border, thus creating the possibility of a non-aggression pact in due course; and three, to recognise the LAC as the de facto border, thus generating an atmosphere of transforming it into a lawful frontier.

V

The terms of the agreement clearly point out two things.

Firstly, it takes into account the interests of the two countries and as such is a reasonable and viable document.

And secondly, it is only an interim measure forming the basis of a series of further negotiations to arrive at a final settlement.

Obviously, the transition from Nehruvian chauvinism to the post-cold war realpolitik has taken a long time in crystallising into something concrete.

VI

The agreement has been welcomed by wider sections of the people in India, China and the world. But, it has also been seriously criticised by certain sections.

One section (BJP and the like) has expressed its concern over the formalisation of the LAC as the actual border between India and China.

Another section (George Fernandes and the like) has characterised this agreement as a national betrayal due to its disregard of the questions of Tibet and Sikkim.

Still another section (Ram Jethmalani and others) has demanded the upholding of the 1962 parliamentary resolution pledging "to get back the territories occupied by the Chinese". They are critical of the fact that the acceptance of the LAC would formalise the Chinese occupation of India's Aksai Chin Area.

All those opposing the Sino-Indian agreement forget that there

are, and have been, two options before India concerning the Sino-Indian border dispute. One is to settle the dispute amicably through a policy of give and take. And the other is to sort it out through a military solution.

The latter option had been persistently pursued by New Delhi for the past 30 years, with disastrous results to our national interests. In the present world balance of forces, the line of military solution has become highly counter-productive. Further adherence to the military course will impose increased burdens on our economy, politics and culture. That is to say, it will harm our economic growth, weaken our political stability, militarise our culture and isolate our country from the peace loving world community.

The adoption of the way of dialogue and negotiations will positively contribute to the all-round development of our nation.

As regards the criticism on the questions of Tibet, Sikkim and the ceding of Indian territory, it is high on emotion but low on reason.

With regard to the question of Tibet, it is highly unreasonable to tag it with the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. It has never been a part of India and the latter has nowhere made such a claim. So, it cannot be a component of Sino-Indian border problem. If, for argument's sake, one accepts the Tibetan question as a part of our national problem, then he should also support Dalai Lama's demand of immediately ceding India's Arunachal Pradesh to the Tibet region of China. However, it is necessary that, being a neighbour, India should take full interest in the democratic resolution of the Tibetan problem through a dialogue between China and the representative of Tibet.

With regard to the problem of Sikkim, the Chinese acceptance of the LAC as a de facto border constitutes their factual recognition of Sikkim as a part of India.

With regard to the issue of the ceding of Indian territory, a compromising settlement will definitely involve some give and take.

While India verbally concedes the Aksai Chin area (under Chinese occupation) it gets many times more the NEFA region (claimed by China as its territory).

VII

Experience shows that the emotion surcharged 1962 parliamentary resolution enjoining upon the Indians to throw out

the Chinese from the Indian territory has enchained our country from taking any realistic initiative on the Sino-Indian boundary question. Therefore, the national interests demand that this rigid and confrontationist resolve be rescinded by Parliament. But, in the given balance of forces, Indian Parliament is not, and will not be, ready to abrogate it.

However, both the call of times and the national cause demand of New Delhi and the mainstream parties to rise to the occasion by evolving a national consensus on a new China policy, without giving any consideration to their partisan interests far a while. India cannot do anything worthwhile, if it remains tied to its boundary disputes. 21-09-1993

Israeli-Palestinian Accord

Opening To A Historic Mid-East Peace

I

(1) It was just unbelievable only a fortnight ago. It has exceeded even the most recent optimistic expectations. This unimaginable event is the signing of a peace accord between the two traditionally implacable foes—Israel and the PLO—who have buried their hatchet to let bygones be bygones and come to an understanding that pushes the past aside and opts for a common future. This landmark accord represents a historical turning point that marks a dramatic beginning to solve one of the bloodiest and the most complex problems bedevilling the international relations for nearly half a century. For the first time in history, mankind gets an opening to a historic Middle-East peace.

II

(2) The brutal nature and the complexity of the Israeli-Palestinian problem has been rooted in several factors—historical, ideological, political, economic, etc.

Historically, the Jew-Palestinian people, belonging to the same Semitic racial stock with Abraham as their common 'Great Patriarch' but having different tribal loyalties and passions, have lived together now in peace and then in conflict in the region of Palestine for centuries. But, since the formation of the Israeli State in 1948, the relations between the two have become antagonistic—leading to four wars and a perpetual confrontation.

Ideologically, the Jews have continued to believe in their God, Jahweh, and consider Palestine as their 'promised land' granted by their god, while the Palestinians, having a firm belief in the Islamic faith have unceasingly regarded Palestine as their birth place.

Politically, the Palestinians have since 1948 held the Israeli State as their sworn enemy, while the latter has looked at the

former as an intruder in their 'holy land'.

Economically, the scarce resources and the burgeoning population of the region have also contributed to strengthen this ethnic divide.

III

(3) This momentous accord was the outcome of a number of factors.

Firstly, it was generated by the dawn of the post-cold war era in which the Soviet Union collapsed as a superpower and consequently the extremists in the Middle East suffered a great set back, particularly in the Gulf War.

Secondly, it was promoted by the joint pressure, exercised by the US and Russia and supported by all the developed countries, on the PLO to come to terms with Israel.

Thirdly, it was facilitated by the discrepancy in the relatively stronger position of Israel and the weaker state of the PLO in the present world balance of forces.

Fourthly, it was made easy by the 1988 Algiers decision of the Palestinian National Council (i.e., PNC, the PLO's Parliament in exile) that accepted the 1967 UN Resolution No. 242, calling for the implicit recognition of Israel.

Lastly, but very importantly, it was fostered by the internal pressures on both sides to seek a compromise. As the experience of the confrontationist line accumulated in time, it taught the Israelis that the management of the occupied territories could not be carried out except by a constant state of war whose mounting cost was unbearable for the Israeli economy. The Hizbollah's continuous pinpricks in the Israeli declared security zone in the South Lebanon and the Hamas' unending attacks in the Israeli occupied West Bank convinced the Israelis that their traditional policy of punishing the Arabs on a massive scale for even a little offence was reaching a dead end.

On the Palestinian side, the PLO with its recent strategic mistakes, was no longer capable of achieving a Palestinian State and Yasser Arafat was rapidly losing credibility among the 18 lakh Palestinians of the occupied territories. The Islamic fundamentalist, Hamas, which opposes any compromise with the Israeli State, was cashing the Palestinian disenchantment in its favour. So Yasser Arafat and his group in the PLO had ultimately come to the conclusion that a version of Palestinian Statehood could he achieved only through an agreement.

Obviously, both Israel and the PLO needed some device to come out of their state of exhaustion.

(4) The credit for seizing the post-cold war historical opportunity goes to Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres and Yasser Arafat. Thus the breakthrough came from the main rivals in the process and not from any third party.

IV

(5) The Accord envisions the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho within four months, allowing these regions to organise their self-rule.

From other West Bank areas, the Israeli troops will be pulled out gradually and then their control handed over to the Palestinian lawful authority.

The Accord further envisages the election of a Palestinian Council within nine months that will exercise its authority in five spheres (i.e., education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism) for a transitional period of five years, during which Israel and the Palestinians will negotiate a permanent peace settlement.

The Council will start building its police force whose core will come from the PLO fighters now living outside West Bank and Gaza.

A joint Israeli-Palestinian liaison committee and an economic cooperation committee are established. The latter will work on the internationally supported economic development programme for the West Bank and Gaza and a regional economic development programme.

By the end of the third year, the two sides would be negotiating the sovereignty of the Palestinian regions. And a permanent settlement will take effect after December 13, 1998.

V

(6) The Accord does not represent a complete solution to the Palestinian problem. It is only an interim agreement which lays down the principles of the transitional phase and the broad points about an overall solution. That is why it is limited in scope and contains many ambiguities and shortcomings.

One shortcoming is that, being a secret deal, its two contracting parties could not prepare the ground well enough and sprang a surprise on their respective people by its sudden announcement. They failed to keep their respective sympathising

countries well-informed. Many of the moderate Arab regimes are upset that they were not even informed.

The other is that it remains vague on certain main points of the problem, such as the question of 140 Israeli settlements with 1,20,000 settlers in the occupied lands, the problem of Jerusalem, the issue of repatriation of about 8,00,000 Palestinians who had fled their homeland during 1948 and 1967 wars, etc.

A third one is that it gives recognition to Israel without accepting the political identity of the Palestinians and their legitimate national rights.

These weaknesses were unavoidable in the given conditions.

VI

(7) The Accord has been welcomed all over the world. It is being actively supported by the US, Russia, EC, Japan, the Nordic countries, the moderate Middle-East regimes and the peace, democratic and human rights organisations in all countries. The resounding world acclaim of this Accord has been amply reflected at its White House signing ceremony in Washington.

(8) It is being vigorously opposed by all sorts of fundamentalists, i.e., the economic fundamentalists like the classical communists, the communal fundamentalists like Iran, Iraq, Libya, Yitzhak Shamir group of Israel, the anti-Arafat factions among the Palestinians, etc.

The fundamentalist are trying to exploit the primordial national and economic animosities, religious passions and concerns.

The Palestinian hardliners are, opposing the Accord for 'selling out' the Palestinian cause by accepting mere self-rule under Israeli sovereignty in just a part of the occupied territories—thus representing a political defeat. They are criticising the Norwegian brokered secret talks which, according to them, had kept the 'enemy' fully informed, while maintaining the Palestinians and the Arabs in the dark. The Accord, they allege, nullifies the Palestinian national cause adopted by the PLO in Cairo in 1968 which characterises the Israeli State as the instrument of the Zionist movement and calls on all Arabs to wipe out this State for the liberation of Palestine.

The two other components of the PLO—the Popular Front and the Democratic Front—have rejected the Accord. Ahmed Jibril of the Popular Front General Command, which is not a part of the PLO, has threatened to kill Yasser Arafat.

The Israeli hardliners complain that the Accord gives too much

to the adversary in exchange for too little and ignores the long-term Israeli interests by secretly conceding on the issues of the Palestinian State, future of Jerusalem, final borders, etc.—thus sowing the seeds of the destruction of the Israeli State.

(9) The potential for violence from the fundamentalists on both sides cannot be discounted. But, as shown by the recent surveys, most of the Israelis and the Palestinians, although wary, seem ready to give peace a chance.

VII

(10) The implementation of the Accord is not going to be a smooth affair. It is bound to be an arduous task. There are many challenges to carrying forward the peace process. The centuries old Arab-Israeli animosity is one of such challenges which is not going to disappear overnight. The other challenge arises from the deep divisions in the Palestinian community and among the Israelis. The third challenge comes from the opposition of the Islamic fundamentalists. The transformation of an armed guerrilla body (i.e., the PLO) fighting for a specific national cause into a democratic organisation, with a new purpose and role, will be the fourth daunting task. The question of financing the Palestinian Home Rule programme will present the fifth difficult question.

(11) Both Rabin and Arafat are now selling the Accord by putting the best face on it to meet their diametrical needs.

VIII

(12) Will the Accord work? This depends on five things. Firstly, its success relies on its proper implementation which can to a great extent induce the Palestinians in its favour. Secondly, it rests on Israel's capacity to make a reasonable peace with other Arab States—i.e., Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, etc. A reasonable compromise on all Arab fronts is likely to weaken the opponents of the Accord, spread all over the world, on the one hand, and to lead to a stable peace, on the other. Thirdly, it is connected with the solution of the pending issues to be resolved between Israel and the would-be elected Palestinian Council. Fourthly, it is related to the moral and material support to be provided by the world people, especially those from the developed countries. The latter can help in making the Accord more productive by giving economic and technical assistance to the autonomous Palestinian region, by continuously persuading Israel to take proper steps for the establishment of the Palestinian State and by

bringing needed pressure on the hardliners who are determined to sabotage the Accord. Fifthly, it is linked to the mutual trust and close cooperation between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Council in working out the Accord.

IX

(13) What conclusions can be drawn from this historic Accord?

It, firstly, shows that the newly emerged era of globalism or the era of the interdependence of countries is characterised by its own priorities—i.e., environmental protection, sustained development, rule of law, federalism, collective security, etc.—quite contrary to the cold war era priorities of national defence, self-reliance, authoritarianism or centralism, etc.

It, secondly, shows that, corresponding to its priorities, the new era is distinguished by its two specific principles for resolving different disputes, namely, dialogue and negotiations—which are entirely distinct from the cold war era rules of confrontation and military solution.

It, thirdly, shows that, corresponding to its main features, the new era is marked by a new democratic spirit in which force is becoming ineffective to control the common people, keep an unwilling people under subjugation or to maintain the occupation of any alienated region for long.

X

(14) The coming few months will be a period of great trial between the democratic and the fanatic forces in Israel, Palestinian regions and the Arab world. While the former engage in solving the intricate problems of Accord implementation, the latter will do everything to undo this process.

(15) There is every possibility that the Middle East peace process will not be halted. The biggest factor in the continuation of this process is the identical view of the US, Russia and all other developed countries on the Israeli-Palestinian Accord. If by chance the Accord fails, it will result in the weakening of democratic and the strengthening of the diehard forces in the Middle East. 23-09-1993

PSLV Fad

Should It Be A Priority For A Poor Country?

(1) The first developmental flight of the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) from Sriharikota failed to put the Indian Remote Sensing Satellite, IRS-1E, into the specified orbit.

(2) Explaining the failure, an official release said that the lift off was perfect and all the propulsion stages appeared to have worked well. However, due to an anomaly during the third stage propulsion, the IRS-1E could not be put into the specified orbit. The flight ended at a suborbital level. According to a spokesman of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), the failure of the PSLV was due to an 'unexpected disturbance' around the separation of the second stage from the third, resulting in change in the pitch attitude of the rocket leading to inadequate upward velocity. The PSLV never recovered after that and plunged into the sea somewhere off the Sri Lankan coast. The flight lasted 565 seconds as against the expected 1,000 seconds or so.

(3) One explanation being given for the anomaly in the third stage is that the autopilot should have ordered the engine to swivel (gimbel) to a certain position. But it only gave the command to execute it to half the position required, thus taking the rocket off course and compelling it to eject the satellite much before the desired altitude. Another explanation is that there have been some problems at the fourth stage and the engines failed to provide the right thrust to put the satellite into the desired orbit. Still another explanation is that something went wrong from the outset and the error correction system failed to do the needful till the anomaly arose in the third stage.

(4) So far, India's earth observation satellites—IRS—were launched by the Russian rockets. This time, India tried to do the same on its own, but could not. While the SLV-3 launched in July 1980 was 22.7 meter tall, all solid four stage rocket weighing 17

tonnes and carrying a satellite of 40 kg, the PSLV has been 44 metre tall and 275 tonnes in weight and was to throw a satellite 900 kilometre into space.

(5) The PSLV was a four stage rocket. Its first stage had a newly developed 500 tonne thrust solid fuel motor and six 70 tonne thrust SLV-3 rockets strapped around it. The steel used in its main motor has taken seven years for its development.

The second stage of the PSLV employed one 80 tonne thrust liquid engine rocket, named *Vikas*. It was developed in collaboration with France. The third stage was a 7 tonne solid propellent motor, while the fourth stage was again a liquid propelled one.

The IRS-1E which was to be launched by the PSLV carried a German made Monocular Electro Optical Stereo Scanner (MEOSS) and a Linear Image Self Scanner (LISS) camera similar to that on board IRS-1A.

(6) The failure of PSLV will delay the programme to develop capability to launch 1,000 kg satellites into polar orbits. It will take at least a year to redesign the launcher to incorporate the lessons learnt from PSLV's failure and think about another launch.

(7) It took more than 12 years to build the PSLV at a cost Rs. 450 crore. Over 150 public and private sector companies had taken part in this project.

(8) This is with regard to technical and financial dimensions of the PSLV.

(9) As regards its national importance, it occupies a high position in our list of national priorities. New Delhi claims that it is highly essential for our national development. But every informed person in our country knows that the PSLV was one of the three technologies which, being mainly usable in missile preparation, had come under US sanctions following the Cryogenic Engine controversy and that, prior to PSLV fiasco, several leading Indian Dailies were proudly announcing that the PSLV's successful flight would enable India to make ICBM's and Spy Satellites.

(10) The experience has proved that India's post-1947 top military priority has kept its economy backward, made it a marginal player in the international sphere and played havoc with the living conditions of its people.

(11) Today, our county remains in the grip of a financial crisis. It is living on borrowed money, external as well as internal. There is widespread public concern about how long we can subsist on

borrowings. Much of these borrowed funds, instead of going into productive investment, are being wasted on sterile schemes. For instance, a staggering sum of six billion dollars of foreign exchange is spent on the import of petroleum products and nearly half of these imported products are burnt by trucks, buses, cars and two-wheelers. Can the wasting of such a huge borrowed sum be considered a national need. The losses in the state electricity boards, state transport undertakings and central and state managed projects run into billions of rupees.

(12) While huge sums are being wasted in infertile plans, agriculture, the lifeline of 70% of our total population, remains in fetters. The paucity of capital has continuously kept it within traditional confines. According to the 1990 high powered committee on agriculture, the scarcity of capital in agriculture is mainly responsible for its perpetual low productivity and slow growth. It is the miserable state of Indian agriculture that still compels our country to spend millions of dollars out of borrowed foreign exchange on food imports. Financing of agriculture is solely based on nationalised banks and state controlled lending institutions. Persons with Rs. 50,000 annual income continue to be barred from investing in agriculture.

(13) Even today, nearly half of our population goes to bed with one-third empty stomachs, one-third stays homeless and two-fifths remains illiterate.

(14) In the face of such a fragile economy and miserable living conditions, can our country afford clinging to unproductive military priorities, like the PSLV, whose civilian utility is easily available in the international market at far less price than the one we are wasting on our security fancies.

(15) The proper course to ensure the safety and security of our country in the new era of globalism or the interdependence of countries lies not in wasting resources on military build-up but in securing peace and tranquillity on our national boundaries by taking desirable initiatives to resolve all types of conflicts (including that of Kashmir) with our neighbours, especially Pakistan. Upholding military solutions in the new epoch will, and can, only lead to a sorry end. 25-09-1993

Seven Time Bombs Ticking Before Our Country

I

(1) Our 46 year old national landscape, erected by the sweat and blood of our people since 1947, does not present an inspiring look today. There are few reasons for cheering the past and fewer still to feel satisfied about the present. The future seems to be an uncertain entity.

II

(2) Emerging on August 15, 1947, from the biggest communal holocaust, never seen at such a gigantic scale by history, the process of our nation-building, rooted in the Gandhian and Nehruvian visions, has resulted in the strengthening of all our national weak points and the weakening of all national plus points. Passing through a series of crises and failing to deliver good on all counts, this process in now back to square one. The post-1947 national builders may, according to their own standards, claim best performance. But the hollowness of their claim is evident from the fact that even their best is not good enough to take care of the country's bare needs. The result is that our national scene has never been so dispiriting as it is today. To sum up as concisely as possible, this national scene is being charactised by seven main features which are threatening the process of our national unity and modernisation.

III

(3) The first threat comes from the criminalisation of politics which has turned our country into a violence prone nation. The term, in general, denotes the violation of the rule of law pertaining to various social spheres. In particular, it implies the misuse of power in various forms implicitly or explicitly. The criminalisation of politics has taken on various forms.

(4) The crudest form is where the criminals themselves

have become the wielders of power either by entering the legislatures (including local bodies and panchayats) or holding important positions in the main national parties. It is now estimated that about 10% of the legislators are composed of shady elements of various hues.

(5) Another form of the criminalisation of politics is that the politicians have established a nexus with the criminals, on the one hand, and the police, on the other. This politician-criminal-police nexus exists in all spheres. Today, almost all criminals have formed different mafias whose dons are allied with the top leaders of one or the other mainstream party.

(6) The third form of the criminalisation of politics is the emergence of power brokers and ultra-constitutional centres at different levels. They claim authority on the basis of proximity to the Prime Minister (i.e., individuals like Chandraswami, Subramanyam Swami, etc.) and other cabinet ministers or ruling party's top leaders. From the Prime Minister's Office down to the Panchayat level, the extra-constitutional centres are privy to governmet decisions in the same way as the Sanjay Gandhi coterie was at one time. Congress itself has become the biggest centre of powerbrokers without whose recommendation the people cannot get any 'justice' or 'concession' from any state organ or government office. Other main national parties, corresponding to their capacities, too behave in the Congress like fashion. The result is that the entire power structure, devoid of any lofty purpose, is afflicted by rampant factionalism, rank opportunism, corruption, favouritism, etc.

(7) The fourth form of criminalisation of politics is the all-round corruption, especially the political one. All legislators begin their careers with an act of perjury in so for as they falsify their election expense accounts. The governance has come to be looked upon as a synonym for wanton loot. The legitimacy of judiciary and other independent constitutional bodies has come under a cloud. One after another Bofors, Securities Scam, Ramaswami Affair, Harshad revelations, allegations of corruption against Prime Minister's relatives, etc., have served to reinforce the conviction that those in power are locked in the same pursuit and always lend a measure of legitimacy to fraud and wheeling-dealing.

(8) The fifth form of criminalisation of politics is New Delhi's total dependence on state violence to deal with the social conflicts (i.e., the intra-community and intra-caste problems) instead of managing them politically. Today, there is hardly any

social conflict in which the security forces are not directly or indirectly involved. The entire law and order in the states of Jammu-Kashmir, Punjab, Assam and other six states in the North-East is now in the hands of the security forces. In other states, the security forces are involved in many of the major problems.

Today, no Lok Sabha or Assembly election can take place anywhere in India without the involvement of the security forces.

New Delhi's infatuation with the security forces has become so intense that it is now permitting even certain non-governmental bodies to organise their own private armies—e.g., private army of 8,000 personnel organised by the Indian Tea Association in Assam, the raising of 5 companies of ex-soldiers in Jammu-Kashmir for their families' defence from militancy, etc.

Greater involvement of the security forces has sinister implications. It tends to supplant the democratic decision making process, subverts the rule of law and leads to human rights violations. It can also create fissiparous tendencies even in the security forces who cannot remain isolated and insulated for long from the current climate of communalism, casteism and corruption.

No doubt, the security forces are required to supplement the efforts of civil administration in resolving social conflicts. But, in our country, the civil administration has taken the backseat, with the former as the principal agency for tackling the social conflicts.

IV

(9) The second threat comes from Indian poverty which includes the largest numbers within its fold among all the countries of the world.

(10) This year's UNDP report shows that India holds the 134th position in the Human Development Index (HDI), with Pakistan at 120 and Sri Lanka at a respectable 40th position, out of a total of 173 countries. That there are only 39 countries which are worse off than India—this demands introspection rather than self-justification.

(11) Measured by per capita income as per the latest World Bank Report, India ranks 141st—even lower than in UNDP's index. According to this report, if countries with population of less than 20 million are excluded from consideration, India stands the sixth poorest country of the world, exceeded in destitution by Zaire, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Tanzania and Ethiopia. The number of Indians who subsist below the poverty line of absolute poverty is estimated to be about 350 million, out of a

population of around 850 million.

(12) This is a highly shameful record in the 46th year of our independence, especially when the 40 year Indian economic planning has declared the eradication of poverty as one of its main objectives in each plan and when the Indian Constitution guarantees freedom of life and property.

(13) While the country has produced enormous wealth, its fruits have been largely cornered by the affluent sections and the dispossessed and impoverished groups have remained deprived, with scant attention to their education, health and other aspects of human resources development.

(14) Except paying a lip service, every political party has neglected the interests of over 350 million people who are below the poverty line in India. Any direct attack on poverty is possible only if the main national parties make economic development a crucial factor in their agendas.

V

(15) The third threat comes from the Indian state's perspective of centralism which is the most fundamental feature of the Indian Constitution. This Constitution, largely textured on the British colonial principle of paramountcy of the centre, centralises the whole power in the hands of the chief executive. Almost all the main national parties, particularly the Congress and the BJP, consider the perspective of centralism as an essential factor for maintaining unity and stability of India.

(16) The recent historical experience, however, negates the centralised theory of unity and stability. It is, firstly, negated by the dissolution of the most centralised state of the world, i.e., the Soviet Union. The same experience is repeated in the old centralised states of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Earlier, a similar phenomenon occurred in 1971 Pakistan under Yahya Khan's military rule. Still earlier, Germany split into two parts as a result of the centralised Nazi rule. Korea was torn apart as a consequence of Japan's colonial principle of paramountcy of power. Vietnam was fragmented due to French centralised colonial rule. Taiwan separated itself from China after Chiang Kai-shek's centralised rule.

(17) The principle of centralised rule, having been an important factor of unity in old times, has lost its vigour today. Rather, it has become counter-productive. Continuation of this fundamental constitutional principle will harm us further.

VI

(18) The fourth threat comes from the politics of *Hindutva*. This politics, by communalising the Indian political process, firstly, accelerates communal polarisation along antagonistic lines—thus breaking the process of integration of the different religious communities and threatening India's national unity. Secondly, by rousing intra-communal passions and by creating the feeling of historical revenge against the Muslim community, it generates communal riots which disrupt the economic process and destabilise the fragile state of Indian law and order. Thirdly, by flaunting the slogan of *Swadeshi*, it creates hurdles in the way of liberalisation and globalisation of the Indian economy. Fourthly, by rousing aggressive jingoism against Pakistan, it creates animosity between India and Pakistan—thus creating the danger of an Indo-Pak war. Fifthly, by virtue of being a system of thought and belief, it mis-orientates the people to appraise phenomena from the Hindu angle.

(19) Experience shows that the basic principle of the politics of *Hindutva*, i.e., the homogenisation of the majority community or cultural determinism, has neither worked to unite the adherents of Arab culture nor Western, Buddhist or Hindu cultures (i.e., India and Nepal). Some recent developments show how the Slav-cum-Christian culture of Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia (forming about 70% population of the former Soviet Union) could not hold them together within one country and how a similar break-up could not be prevented between the Christianity professing Republics of former Yugoslavia, i.e., Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia or between the Slovak and the Czech regions of former Czechoslovakia. Further, the principle of the homogenisation of the majority community has often resulted in resistance by the minority communities, e.g., in Sudan, Sri Lanka, etc. More, this principle is irreconcilable with the reality of multi-racial, multi-religious and multi-cultural countries.

Thus, the politics of *Hindutva* is an agenda of India's disintegration.

VII

(20) The fifth threat comes from the politics of Mandalism. This politics, employing the strategy of uniting the backward castes with the minorities against upper caste Hinduism injects casteism and minority communalism into politics and uses the caste-cum-minority card to secure electoral gains—thus indirectly providing

incendiary material to the politics of *Hindutva*. Further, its revengeful social justice approach, by putting one caste against another and by inciting minority communities against upper caste Hinduism, creates caste and communal splits among the Indian people—thus showing that casteism and minorityism are no less negative than majoritarianism. More, the practice of clannish and tribal models in certain African countries indicates that, like clannishism and tribalism, casteism too is not a socially cohesive force.

Thus, the politics of Mandalism is as disruptive as the politics of *Hindutva*.

VIII

(21) The sixth threat comes from the politics of Chankyaism (i.e., a methodology of double-dealing and manipulation) which, on the one hand, makes use of Gandhism, *Ahimsa* (non-violence), peace, non-alignment, Nehruvian socialism, secularism, social justice, human rights, etc., and, on the other, surreptitiously practises soft *Hindutva*, mild Mandalism, placid minorityism, different methods of money, muscle and criminal power, etc. Running with the hare and hunting with the hound, this politics, dominating the Indian scene for 40 years, has today lost much of its sheen due to its poor performance in the development of India's human and material resources.

IX

(22) The seventh, but highly grave, threat comes from the Kashmiri militancy.

(23) From its very beginning, New Delhi, backed by the mainstream parties, has considered this militancy as a law and order problem, organised by unruly elements at the instigation of Pakistan. But, being a part of our ongoing overall national crisis, it is very much our own creation.

(24) Responding to this alarming problem according to its misconceived notion, New Delhi's politics of gun, making no distinction between the militants and the common Kashmiris, has resulted in the alienation of entire Kashmiri community. This fact has been repeatedly confirmed by one mass protest after another during the past four years. Besides, the rivalry between the Kashmir lobbies in New Delhi as well as in the Jammu-Kashmir administration, has further weakened New Delhi's standing.

(25) The problem of Kashmir, if not properly resolved through dialogue and negotiations between India, Pakistan and the

people of Jammu-Kashmir, can either lead to India's destabilisation or to the fourth Indo-Pak war which, with its nuclear dimension, can nearly destroy these two countries and harm the world people.

X

(26) The afore-mentioned seven threats are just like seven social time bombs ticking before our very eyes. They are not impenetrable but quiet diffusible before time, provided concrete steps are undertaken to create the needed social technology, i.e., a realistic social agenda for handling social time bombs. This social agenda, corresponding to existing realities, requires a three sided programme: immediate, short-term and long-term.

A

The immediate programme aims at building the broadest possible national consensus of all those who, irrespective of party affiliations, agree to base our nation-building process on the five democratic principles, namely, (i) To uphold the rule of law in all matters, including matters of faith; (ii) To guarantee human rights and social justice as approved by the UN; (iii) To ensure equal rights to minorities; (iv) To separate religion from the state; and (v) To adopt a sustainable development model.

B

The short-term programme aims at freeing our political process from violence, communalism, casteism, money and muscle power, on the one hand, and ensuring the broadest possible mass involvement in the political process, on the other. The reforming measures include: (i) State funding of all types of elections; (ii) Barring of election expenditure by all parties and candidates; (iii) Granting of the right to recall; (iv) Fixing of more than 50% of polled votes for the success of a candidate; and (v) Making of the parties accountable to the people by ensuring their free elections every two years, the authentic auditing of their accounts and the delinking of their politics from religion, caste, race, etc.

C

The long-term programme aims at updating our national model in the light of new realities, national and global. The essential elements of this updated model may be: (i) Adoption of a rational humanist approach; (ii) Establishment of a federal

polity, granting of autonomy to all states, decentralisation of power from top to bottom and resolution of all internal conflicts through peaceful means; (iii) Building of a sustainable development structure focussing on the qualitative improvement of environment and material and human resources and using a judicious mix-up of market mechanism and state planning; (iv) Developing of a new behavioural value system, stressing rational thinking and democratic functioning; (v) Pursuing of a peaceful foreign-cum-defence policy, standing for the resolution of all disputes with Pakistan through dialogue, settlement of Kashmir problem through joint Indo-Pak control over the valley, transforming of the SAARC into a common market with a regional security system, etc.

(27) This three sided programme, matching with the concrete realities, enables our country to melt all sorts of social time bombs, on the one hand, and build a modern society in India, on the other. 30-09-1993